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TARGETED KILLING AND ASSASSINATION: THE U.S.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
William C. Banks *
Peter Raven-Hansen **
"Why not just kill him?"
Stuart Taylor, Jr.1
"Why doesn't Bush just 'take him out?"
John Dean
2
"[Assassination, poison, perjury .... All of these were legiti-
mate principles in the dark ages.., but exploded and held in just
horror in the 18th century."
Thomas Jefferson 3
I. INTRODUCTION
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States re-
newed calls for this country to adopt assassination as an instru-
ment of national security policy. Some editorialists urged assas-
sination not only of Osama bin Laden and other heads of the al-
Qaida terrorist network but also the "fingers" of the network,' in-
cluding the "Gucci guys" who financed the network, landlords
* Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of
Law. B.A., 1971, University of Nebraska; J.D., 1974, University of Denver; M.S.L.S., 1982,
University of Denver.
** Glen Earl Weston Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law
School. B.A., 1968, Harvard University; J.D., 1974, Harvard Law School.
1. Stuart Taylor Jr., Should We Just Kill Saddam?, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 4, 1991, at
23.
2. John Dean, Examining the President's Powers to Fight Terrorism (Sept. 14, 2001),
at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20010914.html (referring to Osama bin Laden).
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 15 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 367 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
4. Lawrence J. Siskind, Our Killer Instinct, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at 61.
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who knowingly harbored them, and others who aided and abetted
their terrorist acts.5 Before September 11, editorialists had also
advocated the U.S. assassination of Libyan strongman Moammar
Quaddafi6 and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein.7 Earlier, in 1988,
the Reagan administration proposed covert U.S. support for a
coup in which Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega could be
killed, which some members of the congressional intelligence
committees reportedly characterized as assassination.' In all
these cases, proponents of assassination argued that any existing
executive policy of self-denial was obsolete and unwise and should
be changed to meet the challenges posed by evil men.
Even if they are right, however, it is never sufficient under the
rule of law that a government policy be merely wise. It must also
be supported by law-or at least by a colorable public argument
for legal authority-in order to preserve the myth that we are
governed by laws, not men. Not only must such a policy not vio-
late any applicable law; it must also assert positive legal author-
ity. Moreover, these basic principles of the rule of law apply with
special force to the extreme policy of intentional, premeditated
killing by a government. Intuitively, such killing without legal
authority is murder. Legal authority is what differentiates mur-
der from lawful policy.
We therefore intend to analyze here the domestic U.S. legal
framework for targeted killing by government, including assassi-
nation. Confining the analysis to domestic law is admittedly arbi-
trary because U.S. law impliedly or expressly incorporates con-
ventional international law (e.g., treaties to which the U.S. is a
party) and, most scholars contend, customary international law
(as part of our common law), includes the law of armed conflict.
Nevertheless, we draw the line at domestic law and therefore do
our own incorporating by reference to the companion articles
treating international law in this symposium volume. We focus on
domestic law partly to save trees, but also because, under the
5. Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs "Targeted Killing" Missions, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
2001, at Al.
6. See, e.g., Brian Jenkins, Assassination: Should We Stay the Good Guys? L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 1986, at V2 (noting public advocacy of killing Moammar Quaddafi).
7. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 1, at 23; Robert F. Turner, Killing Saddam: Would It
Be a Crime?, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1990, at Dl.
8. See David B. Ottaway, CIA Aides Call Hill Rules No Hindrance, WASH. POST, Oct.
18, 1989, at A14.
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last-in-time theory,9 it may supersede incorporated international
law (unless, perhaps, such law rises to the level of jus cogens),1 °
as we discuss below. Domestic law is therefore not only the start-
ing point for legal analysis of killing by the U.S. government but
also often the end point, notwithstanding some interesting inter-
national law issues in between (which we also leave to our sym-
posium co-contributors).
We are hardly the first writers to address the domestic law.11
But most of the existing analyses are dominated by Executive
Order No. 12,333.12 One writer even dismisses everything else as
"the virtually nonexistent domestic authorities beyond Executive
Order 12333. "113 This dismissal not only ignores the rule-of-law
mandate that we must find some positive legal authority for such
acts by the government, but it also disparages a range of "virtu-
ally existing" domestic legal authorities which inform the other-
wise ambiguous executive order (and its progeny), authorize and
regulate targeted killing by the government, and arguably forbid
some kinds of targeted killings.
'But we have now used "targeted killing" and "assassination"
several times already without defining the terms. The difficulty is
that there are no consensus definitions in the literature, laws, or
cases. Some commentators assert that all assassination is murder
and therefore unlawful.' 4 Our federal criminal law reflects the
9. See infra Part VIII.
10. See STEPHEN DYCUS, ARTHUR L. BERNEY, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 239-41 (3d ed. 2002).
11. See, e.g., Chris A. Anderson, Assassination, Lawful Homicide, and the Butcher of
Baghdad, 13 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLY 291 (1992); Jonathan M. Fredman, Covert Ac-
tion, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on Assassination, 1 STUD. IN INTELLIGENCE 16
(1997); David Newman & Tyll Van Geel, Executive Order 12,333: The Risks of a Clear Dec-
laration of Intent, 12 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 433 (1989); Michael N. Schmitt, State-
Sponsored Assassination in International and Domestic Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 609
(1992); Thomas C. Wingfield, Taking Aim at Regime Elites: Assassination, Tyrannicide,
and the Clancy Doctrine, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 287 (1989); Patricia Zengel, Assassi-
nation and the Law of Armed Conflict, 43 MERCER L. REV. 615 (1992); Jami Melissa Jack-
son, Comment, The Legality of Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders: An Exami-
nation of National and International Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669
(1999); Boyd M. Johnson, III, Note, Executive Order 12,333: The Permissibility of an
American Assassination of a Foreign Leader, 25 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 401 (1992).
12. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C § 401 (2000).
13. Wingfield, supra note 11, at 307.
14. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 295; Fredman, supra note 11, at 17; Abraham D.
Sofaer, Terrorism, the Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REV. 89, 117 (1989)
("Under no circumstances, however, should assassination be defined to include any lawful
homicide."); Wingfield, supra note 11, at 295.
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same assumption by using "assassination" in the title of the pro-
vision making it a crime to kill a member of Congress, head of an
executive department, Justice of the Supreme Court, Director or
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, or persons nominated or
elected for such positions. 5 Defining assassination as murder,
however, makes short work of analyzing its legality. It also con-
tains an element of circularity because it renders lawful killings
simply as "non-assassination." Other scholars assert that assas-
sination is not always murder.16 A few of these seemingly have it
both ways, defining assassination as murder in one place, but
carving out oxymoronic categories of "lawful assassination" in an-
other.17 Yet other scholars seem to use the term "assassination"
neutrally, explaining it without legal characterization as the in-
tentional killing of individuals by the state for "political" purposes
(although they disagree whether the victim must be in the politi-
cal elite and whether the form of the killing or the existence of a
state of war matters).l8 Yet when a definition uses "assassination"
to include a lawful killing or uses it neutrally, it collides with col-
loquial understanding by which "assassination" pejoratively con-
jures up the murders of Julius Caesar, Abraham Lincoln, and
John F. Kennedy. No wonder another scholar throws up his
hands, asserting simply that we know assassination when we see
it, before belying his own assertion by citing as his example the
15. 18 U.S.C. § 351 (2000).
16. See Louis Ren6 Beres, On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of
Israel, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 321, 332 (1991); Zengel, supra note 11, at 636.
17. Compare Zengel, supra note 11, at 617 (asserting that "assassination... should be
considered permissible [in some] circumstances"), with id. at 636 (stating that "assassina-
tion ... must incorporate the idea of an illegal killing: what is not murder cannot be as-
sassination"). See also Anderson, supra note 11, at 314; Jackson, supra note 11, at 697.
18. Compare Newman & Van Geel, supra note 11, at 434 (defining "assassination" as
"intentional killing of a high-level political figure, whether in power or not. [It must] be
authorized or condoned by a responsible official of a sovereign state as an intentional state
action expected to influence the policies of another nation.") (citation omitted) and Daniel
B. Pickard, Legalizing Assassination? Terrorism, the Central Intelligence Agency, and In-
ternational Law, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 9-10 (2001) (defining it as "targeted killing
of an individual, by an official agent of a nation, regardless of whether a state of war ex-
ists," but not heads of state) (citations omitted), with Johnson, supra note 11, at 402 n.7
('The premeditated and intentional killing of a public figure accomplished violently and
treacherously for political means'). Of course, not all of these definitions are internally
coherent. How, for example, can a public figure be intentionally killed without violence,
and what does it mean to kill "for political means"? Johnson, supra note 11, at 402 n.7 (em-
phasis added).
[Vol. 37:667
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1986 raid on Quaddafi's compound in Libya, 9 which many other
scholars do not see as an assassination attempt. °
We believe that the term "assassination" should be reserved for
unlawful killing in accord with the colloquial usage. The issue is
then when premeditated killing of an individual by a government
or its agents-which we will call "targeted killing"-is lawful un-
der U.S. law, and when it is assassination. The answer depends
upon which legal framework applies. When the United States is
at war, the framework is the law of armed conflict. Under it much
killing is lawful, but targeted killing of individuals by treacherous
means is not. This is often called "assassination." In peacetime, a
different legal framework applies. For judicial killings-capital
punishment in execution of a criminal sentence-the framework
is criminal law. When the requirements of criminal law-
including constitutional procedures-have been satisfied, such
killings are lawful.21 An extra-judicial killing by a government of-
ficial or agent in peacetime, however, would be lawful only if un-
dertaken in self-defense or defense of others,22 which is presuma-
bly inconsistent with the premeditation of targeted killing.
The astute reader, however, will balk at the simplicity of the
wartime/peacetime distinction and ask what legal framework ap-
plies when the United States is under terrorist attack? When is
targeted killing lawful in this twilight zone between war and
peace, and when is it unlawful and therefore assassination? Thus
refined, these are the questions we seek to answer in this article.
We begin in Part II by briefly describing the constitutional
framework. We show that this framework vests in the President
as commander in chief the authority to order killing in defense of
the United States and does not protect aliens unconnected with
the United States from targeted killing by U.S. officials. It also
incorporates into our law self-executing conventional interna-
19. Johnson, supra note 11, at 402.
20. See, e.g., Guy B. Roberts, Self-Help in Combating State-Sponsored Terrorism: Self
Defense and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 243, 286-88 (1987).
21. See Anderson, supra note 11, at 300-06; Schmitt, supra note 11, at 641-42. As we
note above, we leave the analysis of the law of armed conflict, as international law, to
other symposium writers.
22. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1980); Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Gar-
land, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289 (1974); John F. Wagner, Jr., Annotation, Standard for De-
termination of Reasonableness of Criminal Defendant's Belief, for Purposes of Self-Defense
Claim, That Physical Force Is Necessary, 73 A.L.R. 4th 993 (1989).
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tional law, and arguably some customary international law,
which it then subordinates to later-in-time domestic legislation
and executive acts. The Constitution, then, mainly remits us to
domestic legislation and executive orders for authority for and re-
strictions on targeted killing.
In Part III, we briefly explore the traditional criminal law pro-
hibitions of murder at the time the CIA-our most probable agent
for targeted killing-was established. We conclude that, with one
possible exception, these prohibitions did not have extraterritorial
reach. The exception is the Neutrality Act which-absent super-
seding legislation-may prohibit targeted killings of the political
leaders of nations with whom we are at peace.
In Part IV, we then consider the first and arguably central
piece of superseding legislation-the National Security Act of
1947's grant to the CIA of authority to conduct "other functions."
While this grant may not initially have included targeted killing,
we show in Part V that it was intended as a dynamic authority to
be shaped by practice and necessity, and that the practice fitfully
came to include the plotting of targeted killings, including assas-
sinations. We cite a rare judicial opinion which also finds that un-
til 1981, the date of the first executive order banning assassina-
tion, the CIA was authorized to violate criminal laws by the
vestiture of "other function" authority by the National Security
Act.
By the same date, the Congressional Church Committee had
learned and disapproved of assassination and the plotting of as-
sassination by the CIA or its agents and proposed a bill to pro-
hibit it. President Ford preempted that prohibition, however, by
issuing his own prohibition of "political assassination" in an ex-
ecutive order.
In Part VI, we trace the origins of this prohibition and inter-
pret it by reference to the bill which it preempted and to the
Church Committee findings which led to the bill. We conclude
that the executive prohibition was intended only to prohibit kill-
ing of foreign political leaders-who would not include freelance
terrorists such as Osama bin Laden-and then only when the
United States was not in hostilities authorized consistently with
the War Powers Resolution, such as the Gulf War or the "war" on
those responsible for the September 11 attacks. We examine sub-
sequent refinements of the executive prohibition and conclude
[Vol. 37:667
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that they did not substantially enlarge its application. Further-
more, we show that the executive prohibition can be (and has
been) secretly waived by the President for particular cases. The
executive order's prohibition, in short, was never absolute and is
best viewed as a management control for insuring that the Presi-
dent alone makes the decision for peacetime targeted killing.
Part VII then analyzes additional management controls-
including written presidential findings and reports to Congress-
imposed on the decisionmaking process by intelligence oversight
legislation. While the latest incarnation of such legislation-the
Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991-effectively prohibits cov-
ert actions that would violate the Constitution or any statute of
the United States, this prohibition only directs us back to the le-
gal framework we have already explored and therefore adds no
new prohibitions on targeted killing.
But do any other more recently enacted laws prohibit targeted
killing? In Part VIII, we show that legislation implementing the
Convention on Internationally Protected Persons would prohibit
targeted killing of foreign political leaders while they are travel-
ing outside their own country, but also that even this prohibition
must give way to subsequent particularized grants of authority to
use force. The targeted killing of terrorists is therefore not unlaw-
ful and would not constitute assassination as we have used the
term, and neither would the targeted killing of Saddam Hussein
during the 1991 Gulf War.
If Parts II-VIII establish a U.S. legal framework authorizing
U.S. officials to conduct targeted killing in certain circumstances
subject to certain procedural requirements, can that authority be
delegated outside the U.S. government? In other words, can the
CIA employ local "dirty assets" to carry out a targeted killing? In
Part IX, we conclude that the United States may support a coup
where the death of a leader is likely, so long as U.S. officials do
not approve the targeted killing plan. We also argue that any
doubt of the delegability of authority for targeted killing of terror-
ists involved in the September 11 attacks was lessened by post-
September 11 legislation.
We conclude in Part X by addressing the implications of our
analysis for proposed legislation both to authorize and to prohibit
assassination. We find that neither is wise or necessary, as long
20031
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as the President keeps tight management control on this contro-
versial and last-resort tool of national security.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
We begin our analysis of the constitutional framework for tar-
geted killing with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and
the intuition that such killing is unlawful. We then consider
whether the constitutional framework applies to aliens abroad or
applies in wartime. Next, we consider whether a consistent ex-
ecutive practice in which Congress acquiesces can ripen into cus-
tomary constitutional authority for targeted killing. Finally, we
turn briefly to the question whether international law that is in-
corporated into our own law affects the analysis.
A. The Fifth Amendment
Most persons share the intuition that the Constitution prohib-
its targeted killing of U.S. citizens in the United States. But why?
The only crime actually defined by the Constitution is treason.23
One answer lies in the Due Process Clause's protection of "any
person" from being "deprived of life ... without due process of
law."24 Capital punishment is not unlawful because it is imposed
with the full judicial process of criminal law. Extra-judicial killing
ordinarily lacks such process. Another answer lies in the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures. Killing
a suspect when apprehension is impossible or possible only at
risk of serious harm to the arresting officers or others is reason-
able as a last resort.26 Killing when apprehension is possible
without risk of serious harm to self or others is not, and violates
23. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that people have the
right "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. (emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 367 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated as moot, 266
F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001). The court stated that
[1]aw enforcement agents may use deadly force only if they reasonably believe
that killing a suspect is necessary to prevent him from causing immediate
physical harm to the agents or others, or to keep him from escaping to an
area where he is likely to cause physical harm in the future.
Id. at 367; see also Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1997).
[Vol. 37:667
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the Fourth Amendment.2 ' Thus, a pre-planned killing under
"shoot-to-kill" rules of engagement, occurring before such a neces-
sity arises, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.2" As a
federal court said in reviewing the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion's shoot-to-kill rules of engagement at Ruby Ridge, "[s]uch
wartime rules are patently unconstitutional for a police action."
29
It follows that the premeditated killing of a U.S. citizen in the
United States-an assassination, as we have used the term-
would be unlawful.
B. Applicability to Aliens Abroad?
But advocates of targeted killing typically urge its direction
against aliens abroad.3" How does this change the constitutional
framework, if at all? Does it apply to aliens abroad?
Writing for the Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert,3 Justice
Black asserted that "[tlhe United States is entirely a creature of
the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It
can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution."3 2 Reid suggests that government agents cannot es-
cape constitutional strictures against targeted killing by going
abroad after foreign nationals because the Constitution would go
with them."
Subsequent cases, however, raise some doubt as to whether, or
how much, the Constitution travels. In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,"4 the Court held that "the people" protected by the
Fourth Amendment do not include aliens outside the United
States who lack "substantial connections with this country."
35
Thus, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable
27. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d at 367.
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 11.
31. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
32. Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
33. Cf. id. (rejecting the proposition that the provisions of Article III and Amendments
V and VI did not "protect an American citizen" tried by the United States in a foreign
country).
34. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
35. Id. at 271.
2003]
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seizure would apparently pose no barrier to the targeted killing of
an "unconnected" foreign national abroad.
The Fifth Amendment, however, protects "any person," and not
just "the people," from the deprivation of life without due proc-
ess.36 Concurring in Verdugo-Urquidez, Justice Kennedy therefore
distinguished Fifth Amendment rights of aliens abroad, speculat-
ing that "[a]ll would agree ... that the dictates of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant," a Mexican
national residing abroad.3" If so, then the Fifth Amendment also
protects against targeted killing abroad, as one appellate court
has expressly stated 'in dictum. But the majority in Verdugo-
Urquidez also impliedly rejected the claim that enemy aliens may
be entitled to due process rights abroad.39 Citing this dictum, the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has more recently squarely rejected
the claim that the Fifth Amendment prohibits U.S. agents from
torturing foreign nationals abroad.4" If that court is right, the
Fifth Amendment would pose no barrier to targeted killing of for-
eign nationals either.
But perhaps Reid still survives in more modest form. In his
Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, Justice Kennedy reconciled the
case with Reid by reasoning that while the Constitution does
travel with U.S. agents abroad, constitutional rights 'do not nec-
essarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place."'41 What
is unreasonable in the United States may be reasonable abroad
under foreign circumstances: "we must interpret constitutional
protections in light of the undoubted power of the United States
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
37. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
38. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 945
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (hypothesizing that targeted killing of U.S. nationals living in Nicaragua
by U.S. personnel could constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause). The court stated that "[i]f the state officer's action [has] caused severe injuries,
was grossly disproportionate to the need for action under the circumstances and was in-
spired by malice rather than merely careless or unwise excess of'zeal,' then a due process
violation is likely." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d
263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981)).
39. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950)). Eisentrager, in fact, held that such aliens were not entitled to obtain writs of ha-
beas corpus on the grounds that their Fifth Amendment rights had been violated. 339 U.S.
at 768.
40. Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 602-04 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
41. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Reid v. Cov-
ert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
[Vol. 37:667
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to take actions to assert its legitimate, power and authority
abroad."42
Furthermore, even if constitutional limitations do not necessar-
ily protect a foreign national abroad from actions by U.S. agents,
such agents remain entirely "creature[s] of the Constitution" who
must still trace their power and authority to the Constitution or
law made pursuant to it. 43 Whether or not foreign nationals have
any right to invoke constitutional protections, U.S. officials may
still be constitutionally required under Reid to invoke positive le-
gal authority to conduct targeted killing. This mandate may not
be judicially enforceable, but it is well established that not every
44
constitutional mandate is for the courts to enforce.
C. Are "Wartime" Rules Different?
The Ruby Ridge case quoted above found "wartime [shoot-to-
kill] rules patently unconstitutional for a police action."45 Are the
rules then patently constitutional in war? As commander in chief,
the President has the constitutional authority to command the
use of deadly force by troops in war, whether it has been declared
by Congress or thrust upon us by enemy attack or invasion.4" As
noted, the applicable legal framework in a war is then the law of
war, under which the killing of enemy combatants is lawful, ab-
sent treacherous means. The legality of targeted killing then
turns on the target and on the means; there is still some sub-
category of targeted killing which is unlawful.47 The President
may therefore order targeted killing as long as it is consistent
with the law of armed conflict.4
42. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Reid, 354 U.S. at 6.
44. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law,
109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999).
45. Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 F.3d 359, 377 (9th Cir. 2001).
46. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862) ("If a war be made by inva-
sion of a foreign nation, the President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by
force .... [He] is bound to accept the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority.").
47. See W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12,333 and Assassina-
tion, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 4.
48. See id. at 5.
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The constitutionality of "wartime rules" for deadly force, how-
ever, is not quite as "patent" when we leave the arena of conven-
tional war and enter the twilight zone of terrorist attacks. Un-
doubtedly the President still has the constitutional authority
under the Commander in Chief Clause to "repel sudden at-
tacks,"49 but that authority has traditionally had a real time di-
mension-or at least an inherent imminence requirement-by
analogy to the doctrine of self-defense at international law."° A
terrorist attack, however, is usually over before it can be repelled
in real time. Moreover, when the attack is a suicide attack, it is
impracticable to strike back. Additionally, alternatives to force
that may be effective to deter state-sponsored attacks are ineffec-
tive against freelance terrorists. Yet, as we have seen, even at
home in the United States, the government may constitutionally
use deadly force to prevent a dangerous suspect from doing harm
to others if no peaceful means is left to apprehend him.52 It would
be anomalous if the Constitution did not vest the same authority
in the President to use deadly force against a terrorist if he has
exhausted other means of apprehending him, as our co-
contributors to the symposium discuss under the rubric of antici-
patory self-defense. 3 Moreover, if the terrorist attacks are con-
tinuing, "the timing of the preemptive action relative to the ex-
pected attack is irrelevant, since the various terrorist acts may be
regarded as part of a continuous operation."54 Preemptive deadly
force is then no longer anticipatory self-defense-it is just self-
defense.55
Our conclusion so far, then, is that the Constitution does not
prohibit the targeted killing abroad of foreign nationals who lack
a substantial connection with the United States, at least in an-
ticipatory self-defense when other more peaceful means of de-
49. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318 (Max Farrand ed.,
rev. ed. 1937); cf. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (finding that the executive has inherent
authority to order the use of force in defense of government officials).
50. See VI THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 261 (Boston, C.C. Little & J. Brown 1851)
(stating that a valid plea of self-defense must rest on a showing of "necessity of self-
defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, no moment for deliberation").
51. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 693; Johnson, supra note 11, at 422.
52. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1201-09 (9th Cir. 1997).
53. Michael N. Schmitt has made the same argument under international law. "As
defensive options become more limited or less likely to succeed, the acceptability of pre-
emptive action increases." Schmitt, supra note 11, at 647.
54. Id. at 649.
55. See id.
[Vol. 37:667
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fense have been exhausted. But if it does not prohibit it, does it
follow that the President alone may order it? Or that he can do so
in the face of a statutory prohibition? Courts have recognized the
President's authority both to fight a de facto war 6 and to inter-
pose force abroad to protect Americans and their property with-
out prior legislative authority." Necessity gives rise to the consti-
tutional authority in both cases, and also justifies the President
in exercising it without awaiting legislation. It does not follow
that he could defy inconsistent legislation. Although judges have
alluded to the President's inherent constitutional authority to
command military troops at war,58 that authority is less clearly
implicated in targeted killing than in his authority to defend
Americans and their property from attack. 9 Yet the courts which
have recognized the latter in the absence of legislation have never
held that Congress could not restrict that authority, or at least
regulate it under the Necessary and Proper Clause.6° To quote
Justice Jackson, cases have "intimated that the President might
act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not
that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress."61 The Presi-
dent's authority to do so, like the constitutional authority for self-
defense itself, may well depend on the necessity for action and the
gravity of the risk, but depending on those factors would leave
room for Congress to ban or regulate targeted killings except in
the extreme case of an otherwise unavoidable catastrophic at-
tack.62
D. Customary Constitutional Authority?
We have written elsewhere that congressional acquiescence
and the development of customary law from executive practice
have special application in national security law, in part because
Congress has found it difficult to prescribe ex ante standards for
56. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862).
57. See Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186).
58. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (stating that "Congress cannot deprive the President of the command of the
army and navy"); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., con-
curring) (stating that "Congress cannot direct the conduct of [military] campaigns").
59. See In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
60. See, e.g., id.; Durand, 8 F. Cas. at 112.
61. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636 n.2 (Jackson, J., concurring).
62. See id.
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executive action.63 , Apart from generously construing broad dele-
gations of statutory authority in national security,64 the courts
have permitted the President to act without legislative authority:
The same factors that permit broad delegations of national secu-
rity authority sometimes require the President to act without ante-
cedent legislation at all. "[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or qui-
escence... [may] enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility," as Justice Robert Jackson put it. In such
cases, the President acts subject to congressional ratification or
countermand; he initiates, and Congress reacts. When he acts with
sufficient consistency over time and Congress knowingly acquiesces,
this interaction may create customary national security law. The
custom evidences the political branches' joint interpretation of the
President's constitutional or statutory authority ....
"[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice," Justice Felix
Frankfurter noted in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, "long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before ques-
tioned,... making as it were such exercise of power part of the
structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive
Power' vested in the President."
65
Customary law may develop as quasi-constitutional law when
the executive takes the initiative in exercising concurrent na-
tional security powers." Or, a custom may develop as a gloss on a
statute when the executive agency "has consistently acted under
a statute in a manner known to Congress, and Congress has ac-
quiesced in the practice by inaction, rejection of contrary legisla-
tion, or reenactment"; the statutory authority for the [agency]
practice "is implied into the statute. 67
The requirement that a custom be "systematic, unbroken,...
[and] long pursued"68 serves to identify the custom and to pre-
scribe the authority that it establishes. Providing notice to Con-
gress permits the requirement of knowing acquiescence. If Con-
gress has notice of the practice and then declines to object when it
could, or reenacts the general legislation that provides the base
63. Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the Com-
mander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 848 (1994).
64. See id. at 848-49.
65. Id. at 849-50 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
66. Id. at 850.
67. Id. (citations omitted); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988).
68. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
[Vol. 37:667
THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
from which the custom emerged, or enacts related legislation that
is consistent with the custom, then it can be said to have know-
ingly acquiesced.69 The executive practice, of course, must not vio-
late any constitutional provision or statute.7 °
As we turn from the constitutional framework to the statutory
law relating to targeted killing and the historical practice, we
must therefore consider whether the predicate for customary con-
stitutional authority for such killing is satisfied.
E. Incorporated International Law?
The question of whether incorporated international law could
also prohibit targeted killing remains. Assuming that interna-
tional customary law prohibits targeted killing,7 and that it is in-
corporated into our federal common law,72 it may yet lack legal ef-
fect in the United States if Congress or the President, let alone
both, have authorized such killing. Under the prevailing interpre-
tation of the Supreme Court's dictum in the Paquete Habana
case, a controlling legislative or (more controversially)" executive
act can supersede international customary law, as later statutes
supersede treaties under the lex posterior or "last-in-time" rule."
If a targeted killing is by order of the President, therefore, it
would supersede inconsistent international law on this view of
Paquete Habana. If it was authorized by statute, the legal effect
would be the same.75 Some, however, have asserted that peremp-
69. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 63, at 852.
70. Id. at 853.
71. See Bert Brandenburg, The Legality of Assassination as an Aspect of Foreign Pol-
icy, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 655, 660-63 (1987); Parks, supra note 47, at 624; Schmitt, supra
note 11, at 624.
72. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that "where there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations").
73. Compare Jonathon I. Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United
States Government to Violate Customary International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986),
with Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound by International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 377
(1987).
74. See Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 599 (1884) ("(So far as a treaty made by the
United States with any foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the
courts of [the United States], it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its en-
forcement, modification, or repeal.")
75. Interestingly, Congress has added a further wrinkle to the last-in-time rule. In the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, § 308(a), 114
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tory norms of customary international law-jus cogens-cannot
be thus superseded, because they are on equal legal footing with
constitutional rules.76 But even if they were on equal footing, the
customary international law arguably "falls short of prescribing
an international norm against assassination."77 Incorporated in-
ternational law thus takes us back to square one: domestic execu-
tive and legislative authorities.
III. TARGETED KILLING AND TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Since we have concluded that the Constitution leaves room for
Congress to restrict or regulate targeted killing, the next logical
question is whether it has done so by traditional criminal law,
and for that matter, whether state criminal laws might also apply
to prohibit targeted killing abroad. Without parsing any of these
laws, it is safe to say that at least some criminalize premeditated
killing. For two reasons, however, it is doubtful that they pose a
legal obstacle.
First, it is well established that such laws are presumed to ap-
ply only to acts performed within United States territory unless
the legislature clearly manifests its intent that the law be given
extraterritorial application. 7' An example of a criminal prohibi-
tion that could be construed to regulate targeted killing if it ap-
plied outside the United States is the Posse Comitatus Act of
1878,"9 which forbids using the armed forces "as a posse comi-
tatus or otherwise to execute the laws" except as authorized ex-
pressly by the Constitution or laws.8 ° Courts and commentators
have generally concluded that the Act does not apply extraterrito-
rially.8 ' Even if the Posse Comitatus Act does apply abroad, it is
Stat. 2831 (2000), Congress provided that no subsequently enacted federal law that im-
plements a treaty or other international agreement "shall be construed as making unlaw-
ful an otherwise lawful and authorized intelligence activity of the United States govern-
ment.., unless such Federal law specifically addresses such intelligence activity." Id.
76. See Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing this claim).
77. Schmitt, supra note 11, at 619; see also Newman & Van Geel, supra note 11, at
441 n.33. But see Comm. of U.S. Citizens, 859 F.2d at 941 (suggesting in dictum that there
is an international customary "proscription against murder").
78. United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Extraterritorial
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unlikely that its limits on military involvement in law enforce-
ment would be construed to limit targeted killing in pursuance of
a military objective.8 2 Moreover, the later-enacted National Secu-
rity Act likely constitutes an exception to whatever general pro-
hibition the Posse Comitatus Act prescribes. 3
Generally, courts have insisted on explicit provision for extra-
territorial application, although they have excepted a small class
of criminal laws that are not dependent on locality for the gov-
ernment's jurisdiction and that are intended to protect govern-
ment functions when that purpose would be advanced by apply-
ing the law extraterritorially.84 Perusal of traditional criminal
laws that might apply to targeted killing, enacted before the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947 created the Central Intelligence
Agency, revealed none that was explicitly, or, apparently, by im-
plication, intended to have extraterritorial effect, with a single
exception.
The exception is the Neutrality Act, first enacted in 1794:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot
or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or
takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be
carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any for-
eign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people with whom
the United States is at peace, shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than three years, or both.85
The Act is both quaintly anachronistic ("sets on foot," "from
thence," "dominion of a foreign prince") and surprisingly modern
(explicitly creating "enterprise" liability), but it might appear at
first glance to interdict a targeted killing abroad if (a) such a kill-
Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 321 (1989); Christopher A.
Donesa, Note, Protecting National Interests: The Legal Status of Extraterritorial Law En-
forcement by the Military, 41 DuKE L.J. 867 (1992). But see DYCUS ET AL., supra note 10 at
777 (questioning the application of the presumption to the Posse Comitatus Act).
82. See Applewhite v. United States Air Force, 995 F.2d 997, 1001 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Thompson, 33 M.J. 218, 220 (C.M.A. 1991).
83. See infra Part IV.
84. United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2000). See generally Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional
Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986); Kevin M.
Kearney, Comment, Private Citizens in Foreign Affairs: A Constitutional Analysis, 36
EMORY L.J. 285 (1987); Joshua Spector, Comment, The Cuba Triangle: Sovereign Immu-
nity, Private Diplomacy, and State (In-)Action, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 321 (2001).
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ing constitutes a "military... enterprise.., against the territory
or dominion of [a] foreign ... state"; (b) the United States is "at
peace" with that state; and (c) the Act applies to persons acting on
behalf of the government.8 6 The first two of these requirements
appear to be satisfied by most or all of the proposed targeted kill-
ings described at the start of this article. 7
It is not necessary that the "enterprise" be literally military-
trained, uniformed, and organized by regulations governing the
armed services."8 It is sufficient that
a number of men, whether few or many, combine and band them-
selves together, and thereby organize themselves into a body, within
the limits of the United States, with a common intent or purpose on
their part at the time to proceed in a body to foreign territory, there
to engage in carrying on armed hostilities, either by themselves or in
co-operation with other forces, against the territory or dominions of
any foreign power with which the United States is at peace ....89
The targeted killing of a government official or political leader
in the foreign state, like Hussein, Quaddafi, or Noriega, arguably
meets this description.9" The targeted killing of bin Laden or an-
other terrorist who is not state-sponsored might not, since it is
not literally directed at the foreign state or dominion. But even in
that case, unless bin Laden were found in international space, the
operation would inevitably intrude on the "territory or dominion"
of any sanctuary state, and the unconsented intrusion might it-
self be construed as armed hostility or an act of war.91 The pur-
pose of the Act, after all, was to protect United States neutrality
from being compromised and the United States from being forced
into hostilities with or between foreign states by ad hoc armed
acts of United States citizens-in short, to secure government
control of violent provocations which-put at risk our peaceful rela-
tions with sovereign states. That purpose is thwarted even by
86. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2000).
87. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
88. See United States v. Hart, 78 F. 868, 870 (E.D. Pa. 1897).
89. United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 F. Cas. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1851); see also United States
v. Murphy, 84 F. 609, 614 (D. Del. 1898); Hart, 78 F. at 870.
90. Accord Brandenburg, supra note 71, at 683 (concluding that "an assassin, even
one lacking the intent to overthrow the government of the victim, would seem to violate
the 'dominion' of the victim's state").
91. But see 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 177, 178 (1869) (construing Act to apply only to actions
against a political entity recognized by the United States as an "independent government,
entitled to admission into the family of nations").
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acts directed at private persons harbored by another sovereign if
the acts provoke the sovereign.
Nor should the "at peace" requirement, properly understood in
its historical context, pose an obstacle to prosecution. The Office
of Legal Counsel has construed it as "the state of affairs in which
there is an absence of a congressionally declared war."9 2 In con-
trast, one federal court has found that the advent of covert and
undeclared war has substantially narrowed the applicability of
the Act by holding that the United States was not "at peace" with
Nicaragua when the administration was funding the Contra
cause against the Nicaraguan government.93 The court's reason-
ing, however, is squarely at odds with the Act's purpose of secur-
ing a government monopoly of such provocative acts.94 Parallel
but independent private military enterprises destroy that monop-
oly and may pose risks to the country's formal neutrality. Gov-
ernment-in accordance with applicable constitutional proc-
esses-can risk neutrality and even wage undeclared war without
thereby immunizing all private acts of war.95 Defining "at peace"
by reference to the formality of declared war, or at least clear
statutory authorization consistent with the War Powers Resolu-
tion,96 not only serves the purpose of the Act, but also provides a
bright line to guide conduct.
At first glance, the third hurdle to a Neutrality Act prosecution
for targeted killing is also easily overcome: it applies, by its
terms, to "[wihoever, within the United States" engages in the
proscribed enterprise.97 By our definition, a targeted killing is of-
ficially approved by the U.S. government, which suggests some
overt act in the United States.98 But, given the purpose of the
statute, should "whoever" be construed literally to apply to pri-
vate persons and public officials alike? Tvo federal courts have
92. 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 58, 69 (1984).
93. United States v. Terrell, 731 F. Supp. 473, 476-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (dismissing a
Neutrality Act prosecution against persons supplying arms to the Contras on the grounds
that the United States was not "at peace" with Nicaragua).
94. Id.; see 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 69.
95. 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 67 ("[T]he Neutrality Act... ensure[d] that the na-
tion's foreign policy was made by the President, with appropriate participation by Con-
gress, working through the political process in fulfillment of their constitutional roles, and
not by the unilateral and unrestricted acts of private individuals.").
96. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 960 (2000).
98. See supra Part I.
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suggested that the answer is yes.99 In an early Neutrality Act
prosecution, Justice Patterson, sitting on circuit, ruled that the
President's knowledge and approval of a military expedition
against a state with which we are at peace would not supply a de-
fense "because the president does not possess a dispensing power.
Does he possess the power of making war? That power is exclu-
sively vested in Congress."'' 0 Nearly 180 years later, a second fed-
eral court-in dictum-again construed the Act to apply to
presidentially authorized actions.'
These conclusions rest not only on the plain words of the Act,
however, but on an anachronistic and historically inaccurate as-
sumption that the government cannot use armed force or violent
means against foreign states unless we are at war.10 2 On the con-
trary, the President has repeatedly deployed force abroad against
states on which Congress has not declared war either by declara-
tion or by statute; sometimes on his own constitutional authority,
sometimes with express statutory authorization short of war, and
sometimes with implied statutory authorization or other congres-
sional acquiescence.0 3 Notwithstanding its language, the Neu-
trality Act should not be construed to criminalize such a broad
range of foreign policy initiatives, at least when they have been
approved by both political branches. Otherwise this crude in-
strument of criminal law would dramatically curtail this coun-
try's flexibility in dealing with foreign states. Instead, construing
"whoever" to mean just private citizens and rogue government of-
ficials acting on their own (contrary to official policy and outside
the scope of their employment) would accomplish the chief his-
torical purpose of the Neutrality Act without this inhibiting ef-
fect.'0 4 The Act should therefore not apply to a targeted killing or-
99. See Dellums v. Smith, 577 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. Smith,
27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806).
100. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230.
101. Dellums, 577 F. Supp. at 1454 ("[T]he history of the Neutrality Act and judicial
precedent demonstrate the reasonableness of the view that the Act applies to all persons,
including the President.").
102. See United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1230.
103. See generally Peter Raven-Hansen, Constitutional Constraints: The War Clause, in
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 29, 32-43 (Gary M. Stern & Mor-
ton H. Halperin eds., 1994).
104. See 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 58, 58 (1984) (concluding that "the Act does not pro-
scribe activities conducted by Government officials acting within the course and scope of
their duties as officers of the United States but, rather, was intended solely to prohibit ac-
tions by individuals acting in a private capacity that might interfere with the foreign pol-
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dered by the President, so long as he does not exceed his author-
ity by violating any other statutory or constitutional prohibition.
In any case, there is another reason why traditional criminal
laws, including the Neutrality Act, do not necessarily prohibit
targeted killing. They, like all legislation, are subject to supersed-
ing laws. If they are inconsistent, and if the inconsistency cannot
be reconciled without violence to any of them, then the latest law
prevails. Even if the Neutrality Act-whose terms have remained
substantially unchanged since it was first enacted in 1794-
applies to criminalize targeted killing, we cannot decide its effect
without examining subsequent laws that may authorize targeted
killing. °5 We therefore turn next to the National Security Act of
1947106 and subsequent related legislation that the Office of Legal
Counsel has argued "necessarily embrace activities that would
otherwise be prohibited by the Neutrality Act if carried out by in-
dividuals acting without Government authorization," and there-
fore "constitute an explicit recognition by Congress of the Presi-
dent's authority to conduct such activities against countries with
whom the United States is 'at peace' within the meaning of the
act.,' 07
IV. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 AND THE FIFTH
FUNCTION
The most important superseding authority was the National
Security Act of 1947108 which cryptically vested in the Central In-
telligence Agency the authority to perform certain undefined
"other functions and duties."0 9 To construe this authority, we be-
gin in Sub-part A with the antecedent practice of intelligence-
collecting agencies of the government. We then discuss in Sub-
part B how it was codified in the Act. In Sub-part C, we focus on
icy and relations of the United States.").
105. See id. at 63 ("The Act today remains substantially similar to that which was first
enacted in 1794.").
106. Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 5, 10, and 50 U.S.C.); see, e.g., 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-05 (2000).
107. 8 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 58, 79.
108. Pub L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495.
109. Id. § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. at 498.
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the legislative history of the "other functions and duties" provi-
sion.11o
A. Pre-1947 Practice
Secrecy was part of governance from the start, indeed, before
the start. In 1775, the Continental Congress created the Commit-
tee for Secret Correspondence, and thus authorized the first offi-
cial American intelligence activity.111 Before the Committee re-
ported to Congress, the members were instructed to delete. the
names of agents they employed or persons with whom they corre-
sponded.112 Throughout our history, U.S. Presidents have em-
ployed secret agents to conduct intelligence on behalf of the
United States. 3 The use of secret agents for gathering intelli-
gence has traditionally been viewed as part of conducting foreign
affairs, where secret gathering of intelligence information may be
essential to the success of policy.'14
In contrast to the practice of secret intelligence gathering,
there is no evidence that U.S. Presidents utilized assassination as
an instrument of foreign policy in the early years.1 5 In a letter to
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson expressed the low regard he
held for the practice: "[A]ssassination, poison, perjury .... All of
these were legitimate principles in the dark ages ... but exploded
and held in just horror in the 18th century."'1 6
The first known American-sponsored assassination attempt oc-
curred during the border war with Mexican bandits in 1916.117
110. Id.
111. 3 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 392 (Worthington
Chauncy Ford et al. eds., 1905) (resolving "[t]hat a committee of five be appointed for the
sole purpose of corresponding with ... Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of the
world").
112. 4id. at 345.
113. See CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTEL-
LIGENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 137-38 (1995);
STEPHEN F. KNOTT, SECRET AND SANCTIONED: COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE AMERICAN
PRESIDENCY 3-5 (1996); HENRY MERRITT WRISTON, EXECUTIVE AGENTS IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN RELATIONS 823 (1929).
114. See, e.g., KNOTT, supra note 113, at 155 (discussing President Wilson's realization
of the need for secret foreign intelligence gathering).
115. Id. at 171.
116. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 3.
117. KNOTT, supra note 113, at 155.
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Unbeknownst to President Wilson, someone from Army General
John Pershing's staff hired four Mexicans to poison revolutionary
leader Francisco "Pancho" Villa by dropping tablets into his cof-
fee.11 The attempt failed and Pershing hid the news of the mis-
sion, even from the President. 9 The cover up lasted until the
1980s when historians uncovered the story.
120
In the years between the world wars, U.S. intelligence activi-
ties abroad withered.1 2' The innocence-or naivet6-of the period
is reflected in the statement attributed to Secretary of State
Henry Stimson in 1929: "Gentlemen do not read each others'
mail."1 22 By 1941, growing fears of German clandestine operations
in Europe led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to appoint his law
school classmate Major General William J. Donovan as Coordina-
tor of Information ("COI") and direct him "to carry out, when re-
quested by the President, such supplementary activities as may
facilitate the securing of information important for national secu-
rity.'1 23 Early on, Donovan wrote to the Secretary of the Navy
that "subversive operations in foreign countries" should be part of
the agency's mandate.
124
By 1942, COI was renamed the Office of Strategic Services
("OSS"), 25 and by military order the President subordinated OSS
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.126 The agency mandate included the
authority to "plan and operate such special services" or covert pa-
ramilitary operations as directed by the Joint Chiefs, as well as
intelligence gathering. 27 Thus, the "special services" were per-
formed by an entity in the military chain of command during a




121. Id. at 155-56.
122. Id. (citations omitted).
123. Presidential Order Designating a Coordinator of Information (July 11, 1941), re-
printed in THOMAS F. TROY, DONOVAN AND THE CIA: A HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 423 (1981).
124. Letter from Major General William Donovan, Coordinator of Information, to
Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy (April 26, 1941), reprinted in part in TROY, supra note
123, at 417.
125. KNOTT, supra note 113, at 156.
126. Military Order of June 13, 1942, Office of Strategic Services, reprinted in TROY,
supra note 123, at 427 [hereinafter Military Order].
127. Military Order, supra note 126, § 2.b.
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Donovan was known as "Wild Bill," 2 ' reflecting his "personal
fascination with gung-ho military exploits" from his days as a
Congressional Medal of Honor winner in World War I.129 Donovan
and his intelligence operatives learned from the practices and
successes of the British Special Operations Executive ("SOE"),
which aided and performed missions with resistance movements
in Europe and Asia. 130 At least in part because Donovan realized
that OSS had to prove its worth to the military and to the Presi-
dent, OSS undertook daring and dangerous missions throughout
Europe, Asia, and Africa. 3' Under General Donovan's leadership,
OSS engaged in a range of covert operations during the war, in-
cluding blowing up bridges in the Balkans, leading tribesmen
against the Japanese in Burma, and conducting guerilla opera-
tions behind enemy lines prior to D-Day.'32 In the North Africa
campaign, "several assassinations were authorized."13 3 Further,
OSS "may have been involved in the assassination of Vichy
French admiral Jean-Franqois Darlan," and OSS operatives re-
portedly had contacts with the group that attempted to assassi-
nate Hitler in 1944.13
OSS was not the only entity that targeted individuals for lethal
force during the war. Relying on an intercept of a decrypted
Japanese signal during the war in the Pacific in 1943, President
Roosevelt is reported to personally have authorized the successful
shoot-down of the plane carrying Japanese Admiral Yamamoto,
leader of the attack on Pearl Harbor.1 35
After the tide of the war turned in 1944, Donovan began posi-
tioning himself to persuade Roosevelt to establish a permanent
peacetime intelligence agency.131 In a direct appeal to Roosevelt,
Donovan urged taking control over intelligence away from the
military after the war and placing the intelligence function "'un-
128. JOHN PRADOS, PRESIDENTS' SECRET WARS: CIA AND PENTAGON COVERT
OPERATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II 15 (1986).
129. JOHN RANELAGH, THE AGENCY: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE CIA 87 (1986).
130. PRADOS, supra note 128, at 15.
131. Id. at 15-16; RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 88.
132. PRADOS, supra note 128, at 15-17.
133. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 88.
134. KNOTT, supra note 113, at 157.
135. ANDREW, supra note 113, at 137-38; see also BURKE DAVIS, GET YAMAMOTO 10
(1969).
136. TROY, supra note 123, at 226-27.
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der the direction and supervision of the President.' 137 Donovan
proposed that the agency "would coordinate, collect, and produce
intelligence" for all government agencies.138 In addition, the new
service should be responsible for "all secret activities" including
"subversive operations abroad," and would perform 'such other
functions and duties relating to intelligence,' as the president
might direct."139 In essence, Donovan's plan was "designed to
make a wheel out of the many spokes" of intelligence then at
hand. 4° When OSS special warfare chief Brigadier General John
Magruder was asked to review Donovan's plan, he opined that
special operations and intelligence were "ancillary to each other"
and that Donovan's proposal was for the peacetime "study of such
operations" so that they "may be quickly developed" when war
threatens. 4 ' However, when civilians from the Joint Intelligence
Staff reviewed Donovan's proposal, they rejected the "subversive
operations abroad" provision and observed that such activities did
"'not appear to be an appropriate function of a central intelligence
service."""
In the tugs of war over control of the intelligence function, the
"subversive operations abroad" provision was dropped out of sub-
sequent proposals for a peacetime intelligence organization.
1 3
There is no record of the topic being discussed again in further
reviews of Donovan's plan, in the development of interim intelli-
gence entities, or in considering the eventual legislation.4
Meanwhile, Donovan's proposal that the new agency "should per-
form 'such other functions and duties relating to intelligence as
the President from time to time may direct' remained, with only
minor changes in language.15 Its meaning was never questioned
in subsequent iterations, including the 1947 Act.1 46 The Joint
137. Id. at 227.
138. Id. at 228.
139. Id. at 221-28 (Donovan's Memorandum for the President is reprinted in TROY,
supra note 123, at 445-47). When Donovan was asked to submit his plans for liquidating
OSS in August 1945, he included a "Statement of Principles" that advocated the creation
of a new intelligence agency "in the foreign field only, to carry on services such as espio-
nage, counterespionage and ... special operations .... Id. at 457-58.
140. TROY, supra note 123, at 228.
141. Id. at 413.
142. Id. at 235.
143. See id. at 413-15.
144. See id. at 415.
145. Id. at 415.
146. Id.
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Chiefs of Staff borrowed Donovan's "such other functions and du-
ties" language, 4 7 as did the Joint Intelligence Committee, creat-
ing a combined military/civilian entity created in World War IU.148
Nothing was resolved before Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945,
and by the war's end in September, President Harry S. Truman
appointed Donovan to the Nuremberg war crimes trials and
signed an executive order dissolving the OSS. 14' The parts of OSS
that gathered and analyzed intelligence moved to the State De-
partment, and the operations staff went to the War Department
as a new Strategic Services Unit ("SSU"). 150 Following Truman's
directive, however, SSU was largely dismantled in early 1946."l'
Within six months, Cold War realities caused Truman to re-
verse course and the President became a proponent of a central-
ized intelligence capability. 152 The emerging Cold War already
generated an intelligence war in Europe, as Soviet and U.S.
agents competed to secure cooperation from German experts, and
as agents and operatives were kidnapped and murdered.'53 Al-
though Donovan was out of the picture, a National Intelligence
Authority ("NIA") was established in January 1946 to oversee a
Central Intelligence Group ("CIG"), created in Donovan's image-
the first peacetime intelligence agency, coordinated and central-
ized under the President's control. 5 4 The NIA was composed of
the secretaries of state, war, and navy, and Truman's personal
representative, the forerunner to the Director of Central Intelli-
gence ("DCI"). 155
The directive establishing the CIG did not authorize covert op-
erations as Donovan proposed; nor were there to be "police, law
enforcement or internal security functions .... "156 However, the
Directive did permit the DCI to "[perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security
147. Id.
148. Id. at 251.
149. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 98-99.
150. Id. at 101.
151. Id. at 102.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 105.
154. Presidential Directive on Coordination of Federal Foreign Intelligence Activities,
11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339 (Feb. 5, 1946) [hereinafter Intelligence Directive].
155. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 102-03.
156. Intelligence Directive, supra note 154, 11 Fed. Reg. at 1337.
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as the President and the [NIA] may from time to time direct." '57
The "affecting the national security" limitation was a revision of
Donovan's language, a qualification that appeared five other
times in the directive.158 In practice, the CIG was a paper entity:
though autonomous, the CIG had no clear mandate and the de-
partments of state, war, and navy were then waging a struggle
for control over intelligence and its operations."'
B. The National Security Act of 1947
The end of World War II and the onset of the Cold War left
President Truman and intelligence officials with a new legal
problem. Americans were celebrating their victory and were not
prepared to continue to struggle against a new enemy. 16 0 Yet the
administration realized that the nation would need a continuing
intelligence capability as if the war never ended.'61 At the same
time, no one expected that the intelligence organization would be-
come a permanent fixture of the post-war world.'62 Thus, the
President decided to continue with the NIA and CIG because he
perceived emergency conditions that would likely abate soon.
163
The legal problem was that the declared war was over-in
peacetime, the intelligence apparatus and its activities needed a
legal footing. 4 The authority over intelligence and intelligence
operations was incident to the President's powers as commander
in chief during the war, including the power to use lethal force
targeted at an individual enemy.' During peacetime, if the CIG
determined to have someone killed, the legal basis for the opera-
tion would be far less certain.
166
CIG General Counsel Lawrence Houston recognized the lack of
legal authority for a permanent peacetime intelligence entity.
1 7
157. Id.
158. TROY, supra note 123, at 347.
159. See id.
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Houston even ventured that, as an entity within the executive
branch, CIG could not exist for more than one year without statu-
tory authorization. 16' Based in part on Donovan's 1944 memoran-
dum to the President, Houston reported to the director in June
1946 that CIG "had 'purely a coordination function with no sub-
stance or authority to act on its own responsibility in other than
an advisory and directing capacity,"' and that the agency might
have no legal status after January 1947.169
The first DCI, Admiral Sidney W. Souers, also cited the need
for enabling legislation in his outgoing progress report of June
1946, presented to his successor, General Hoyt Vandenberg.
170
Because a comprehensive defense reorganization initiative was
already underway, it became expedient to fold the proposal for an
intelligence agency into the larger unification bill. 7 ' The Senate
Military Affairs Committee produced a bill that called for a Na-
tional Security Council-a single military department with one
secretary, an assistant secretary for intelligence, and a Central
Intelligence Agency ("CIA")-similar to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
adaptation of Donovan's proposal.'72
Meanwhile, in July 1946, Vandenberg authorized Houston to
prepare "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence
Agency."'73 Houston prepared the draft and then sent it to Clark
Clifford, the President's Special Counsel. 174 In a meeting to dis-
cuss the draft, Clifford reminded Houston that Truman had not
intended to establish a separate agency and that the January
1946 directive would be an adequate grounding for the CIG.'75
When Houston outlined the problems presented by the CIG oper-
ating as "'a step-child of three separate departments,"' Clifford
168. See id. Houston based his opinion on the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of
1945, Pub. L. No. 78-358, 58 Stat. 387 (1944) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 1347
(2000)), which provided that no agency could operate for more than one year without an
appropriation from Congress. 31 U.S.C. § 1347 (2000).
169. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 106.
170. TROY, supra note 123, at 365-66; see also Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the In-
telligence Advisory Board (June 10, 1946), in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1945-1950: EMERGENCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTABLISHMENT 369, 369-72 (C. Thomas
Thorne, Jr. & David S. Patterson, eds., 1996) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS], available
at http://www.state.gov/www/about- state/history/intel/155_164.html.
171. See TROY, supra note 123, at 368-69.
172. See id. at 368.
173. Id. at 369.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 370.
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agreed to discuss the concept of a new agency with the Presi-
dent.'76 Soon thereafter, the President agreed to incorporate the
intelligence agency within the military reorganization bill but op-
position by some elements of the military to portions of the bill
unrelated to intelligence kept it from moving forward in 1946. 177
Although some who advised Truman recommended that he im-
plement the intelligence part of the reorganization through an
executive order as a non-controversial item, he rejected their ad-
vice apparently for fear of jeopardizing the larger plans for reor-
ganization. 78 Meanwhile, Clifford prepared a bill for the Presi-
dent (while CIG revised its draft) and then sent it to the White
House in December 1946.179 By early 1947, the Cold War was in
full bloom, and fears of Soviet spying and worldwide dominance
filled the newspapers. When the services resolved their differ-
ences in January of that year, Truman ordered his staff to draft a
new bill including the intelligence component.8 0 However, the
new drafters ignored the CIG and Clifford's versions of the bill,
choosing instead to lift the intelligence language from the failed
1946 Senate version-a proposal that reflected none of the CIG
recommendations and that was lacking in detail.' Although mi-
nor revisions were made after protests by CIG, the proposed Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, submitted to Congress on February
26 of that year, included a proposal for a Central Intelligence
Agency along the lines of the 1946 bill.
8 2
As presented, the President's bill did not spell out in any detail
either the functions of the CIA or the restrictions on its activi-
ties.8 3 The White House feared that the CIA concept would be
controversial in Congress and believed that keeping its presence
176. Id.
177. See id. at 369-70.
178. See id. at 371.
179. See Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence (Vandenberg) to the
President's Special Counsel (Clifford) (Dec. 2, 1946), in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note
170, at 538-48 (Doe. No. 201), available at http://www.state.gov/www/about-state/his-
tory/intel'201_214.html.
180. See Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Con-
cerning Creation of a Department of National Defense (Jan. 18, 1947), in PUBLIC PAPERS
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HARRY S. TRUMAN, JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER
31, 1947, at 101-02 (1963).
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relatively inconspicuous might facilitate enactment of the larger
reorganization bill." 4 Although the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee heard from those who wanted the functions of the agency
spelled out, "no one ever questioned or quarreled about the func-
tions. They were simply accepted.""1 5 The bill was reported to the
full Senate in June; the CIA would continue to be governed by the
1946 directive until permanent legislation was enacted.8 6
There was more scrutiny of the CIA proposal in the House.8 7
Congressman Clarence Brown complained that he could not tell
what power or authority the bill would provide the CIA, while
Congressman Mitchell Jenkins stated that the "agency's func-
tions 'should be more accurately defined in the legislation and
less subject to change' by executive order."' Others expressed
the fear that an untethered agency could become a potential "ge-
stapo" and a threat to the civil liberties of Americans.8 9 Senate
Armed Services Committee Chairman Clare Hoffman responded
by introducing a new bill that revised the intelligence provisions
to reflect the criticisms voiced during the committee hearings. 90
Rather than writing from scratch, Senator Hoffman borrowed
from President Truman's NIA/CIG directive and mostly shifted
paragraphs, while ascribing the new duties to the CIA rather
than the DCI. 19' Included in Hoffman's bill was the "such other
functions and duties" language originally crafted by Donovan.'92
Floor debate was minimal in the Senate, and members did not
clarify what they thought the CIA was empowered to do, even
though the Senate bill did not specify the functions of or restric-
tions on the agency.' 9 In the House, most of the limited debate on
the intelligence portions of the bill voiced concerns about protect-
ing against a domestic gestapo, making the DCI a civilian, and
protecting the domestic role of the FBI.'94 Once passed by both
184. See id.
185. Id. at 385.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 389.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 389, 391-92.
190. See id. at 393 (citing H.R. 3979, 80th Cong. (1947)).
191. See id. at 394.
192. See id. at 393-94.
193. See id. at 396 (citing S. 758, 80th Cong. (1947)).
194. See id. at 396-401.
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chambers, a conference committee reconciled the bills, with the
Senate conferees agreeing to accept the limited delineation of CIA
functions and restrictions contained in the House bill."9 5 By July
26, 1947, the revised bill had been passed on voice votes and
signed into law by the President.196
C. Meaning of the Fifth Function
As originally enacted, section 102(d)(5) of the National Security
Act provided that the DCI shall "perform such other functions
and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.'
'1 97
This was called the "Fifth Function" after the subsection in which
it appeared. 19' Textually, of course, "such other functions" could
include anything related to intelligence affecting the national se-
curity that the NSC determined should be pursued. Was targeted
killing among them?
The legislative history does not clarify congressional intent on
the Fifth Function. 9 9 Lifted from Donovan's 1944 proposal to
President Roosevelt, and changed only in minor ways during its
evolution in President Truman's NIA/CIG directive and in the
1946 Senate bill, the Fifth Function was a minor footnote in the
larger struggle over defense reorganization. CIA General Counsel
Houston acknowledged, in a memorandum written just weeks af-
ter passage of the Act, that the legislative history included no
support for the conclusion that Congress intended to authorize
covert action, much less assassination.2 0 In the end, Congress
contributed no original thinking to the functions or duties of the
CIA. Rather, the legislation cribbed from Donovan and the CIG.
Congress, however, did assert successfully the civilian character
195. See id. at 402.
196. See id.
197. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 102(d)(5), 61 Stat. 495, 498
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(5) (2000)). The current provision omits refer-
ences to "the President" and deletes the "from time to time" modifier. See 50 U.S.C. § 403-
3(d)(5).
198. See id.; S. REP. No. 94-755, at 132 (1976).
199. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 132 (1976).
200. See id. (citing Memorandum from the CIA General Counsel to the Director) (Sept.
25, 1947)).
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of the CIA, and members did establish statutory control over the
intelligence function for the first time in our nation's history.
White House Special Counsel Clark Clifford referred to the
Fifth Function as the "catch-all-clause."2 °1 According to Clifford,
the Fifth Function was added because the drafters "were dealing
with a new subject with practically no precedents," and the clause
would "provide for unforeseen contingencies."2' 2 Clifford, a central
participant in the drafting and shaping of the eventual Act, be-
lieved that the Fifth Function was understood by the CIA and
NSC to have authorized the covert operations that were planned
in 1947 and 1948.203 Clifford also believed that the "affecting the
national security" condition was "an important limiting and re-
stricting clause."20 4
Another limitation on the Fifth Function remains, namely that
such activities be "related to intelligence affecting the national
security."20 5 Many of the early covert activities carried out by the
CIA may have been "related" to intelligence affecting the national
security in that the operations were coordinated with intelligence
collection, may have used similar sources and methods, and may
have produced useful information. However, a targeted killing
sponsored by the CIA has no intelligence purpose, even if the op-
eration has a clear effect on national security. The United States
does not gain intelligence information by killing its target. The
elimination of the target may facilitate intelligence gathering, or
may have some relationship to other intelligence operations, but
those relationships are indirect at best.
At the same time, nothing in the 1947 Act expressly prohibited
covert action or assassination.0 6 Absent a prohibition, it is at
least possible that a sustained executive branch practice of con-
ducting such operations could ripen into customary law authori-
zation for them, in view of the potentially dynamic grant of au-
thority contained in the Fifth Function. Regardless, the practice
of carrying out covert operations began almost immediately, al-
though the consideration of assassination as a policy objective
came later.
201. Id. at 144.
202. Id. (citation omitted).
203. See id.
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495, 498 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(5)).
206. See id.
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V. PRACTICE 1947-1974
A. Evolving Practices
In December 1947 and June 1948, the NSC approved two direc-
tives that authorized covert operations. NSC 4-A made the DCI
responsible for psychological warfare." 7 Six months later NSC
10/2 superseded the earlier directive and expanded the CIA re-
sponsibility to include all "covert operations," defined as all ac-
tivities
which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hos-
tile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or
groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Govern-
ment responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons
and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any
responsibility for them.
208
"Plausible denial" became the method for protecting the President
and other senior officials by reporting embarrassing activities in
ways that would enable the senior officials to disclaim knowledge
or responsibility for them. 20 9 As President Eisenhower stated to
Senator Knowland during a 1954 White House meeting, "'in the
conduct of foreign affairs, we do so many things that we can't ex-
plain."'21o
The covert activities covered by NSC 10/2 included:
propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including
sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; sub-
version against hostile states, including assistance to underground
resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and
support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened coun-
tries of the free world.211
207. Memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Souers) to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (Hillenkoetter) (Dec. 17, 1947),
in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 170, at 649-651.
208. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects: NSC 10/2 (June
18, 1948), in FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 170, at 713-15 [hereinafter NSC 10/2].
209. See id.; ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. No.
94-465, at 260-61 (1975) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT] (quoting CIA General
Counsel Memorandum (Apr. 6, 1962)).
210. 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, EISENHOWER: THE PRESIDENT 226 (1984) (quoting re-
marks made during a conference between President Eisenhower and Senator Knowland).
211. NSC 10/2, supra note 208, at 714.
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During the Korean War, President Truman expanded the CIA's
independence in conducting covert operations and enlarged the
agency's authority over guerilla warfare.212 Although President
Eisenhower affirmed the CIA role in conducting covert operations
abroad, he promulgated NSC directive 5412/2 requiring the DCI
to coordinate covert activities with the State and Defense De-
partments to ensure that the activities were consistent with U.S.
policies.2"3 It further required that representatives of the Presi-
dent and the Departments of State and Defense be notified in ad-
vance of any major covert operations initiated by the CIA.214 In
1962, CIA General Counsel Houston opined that CIA activities
were "not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly
set forth" in NSC directive 5412/2.215 Revisions were made to the
policy guidance during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon administrations, but the basic covert operations authority
and procedures remained unchanged until 1970.
The internal decision process for covert action during this time
focused on a "Special Group" of executive officials who would re-
view and approve operations proposed by the CIA.216 The Special
Group was nominally chaired by the National Security Adviser
and included the DCI, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs.217 However, in practice,
membership of the Special Group varied, as did the criteria for
bringing projects before the group and for judging their feasibility
or suitability.28 During 1962, the "Special Group (Augmented)"
was established to oversee covert operations in Cuba.219 Its addi-
tional members included the Attorney General and General
Maxwell Taylor. 220 Typically, proposed actions would come before
the NSC only if there was disagreement in the Special Group-a
212. See Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council: NSC 10/5
(Oct. 23, 1951), in CIA COLD WAR RECORDS: THE CIA UNDER HARRY TRUMAN 437, 437-39
(Michael Warner ed., 1994).
213. See THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: HISTORY AND DOCUMENTS 63 (William
M. Leary ed., 1984) [hereinafter CIA HISTORY] (discussing NSC 5412/2 (Nov. 1955)).
214. See id.
215. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 9.
216. See CIA HISTORY, supra note 213, at 63.
217. See id.
218. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 50-51.
219. See id. at 10.
220. Id.
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procedure that was designed in part to facilitate plausible de-
nial.22'
During the period when CIA involvement with assassinations
of foreign leaders occurred, CIA General Counsel Houston docu-
mented his view that the CIA itself was responsible for imple-
menting the objectives of NSC 5412/2, as well as obtaining "nec-
essary policy approval. 222 As membership in and authorization
procedures for the Special Group changed over time, however, no
clear picture emerged concerning how, by whom, and to what ex-
tent covert operations-including assassinations-were author-
ized. 223 Few formal procedures existed prior to 1955, and an in-
ternal CIA memorandum characterized the procedures in
existence from 1955 through 1963 as 'somewhat cloudy and...
based on value judgments by the DCI.' 224 The Chairman of the
Special Group was normally in charge of deciding which projects
required consideration by the President.225
The Church Committee, created by Congress in 1974 to inves-
tigate alleged United States involvement in assassination plots,
found that in the aggregate, the covert operations processes were
neither formal nor regularly followed. 226 As the Committee noted,
informal processes may have been employed, either ad hoc or on a
more systematic basis.227 The substitute informality might have
been for the purpose of circumventing prescribed procedures in
order to preserve "plausible denial" for the President and perhaps
other high-ranking officials, and/or to serve as a substitute set of
rules for special cases, such as assassination.2" The Church
Committee did speculate that the procedures for authorizing cov-
ert operations were so flawed that "assassination could have been
undertaken by an agency of the United States Government with-
out express authority.229
221. See id. at 9-10.
222. See id. at 9.
223. Id. at 10.
224. Id. (citation omitted).
225. See id.
226. Id. at 6-7.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id. at 6.
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B. The CIA and Assassination Plots
The Church Committee found that between 1960 and 1970,
"the United States was implicated in several assassination
plots."230 Although the Committee's investigations were compro-
mised by the CIA practice of concealing the agency's involvement
and exercising "plausible denial" by purposefully communicating
within the agency and to higher officials in an incomplete, convo-
luted, or misleading way, available contemporaneous documents
and witnesses helped generate a considerable record of U.S. in-
volvement in assassinations." 1 The Committee investigated
United States involvement in plots targeting Patrice Lumumba of
the Congo, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, General Rene Schneider of Chile, and Ngo Dinh Diem
of South Vietnam.232 The CIA also reportedly planned to assassi-
nate Colonel Abdul Kassem in Iraq, although the claim was not
investigated by the Church Committee.233 Kassem was killed by a
firing squad before the CIA had an opportunity to act.234 The ab-
sence of a written record, along with the failing memories of prin-
cipal witnesses, prevented the Church Committee from establish-
ing conclusively that Presidents Eisenhower or Kennedy
personally authorized the assassination of any foreign leader.2 35
Although CIA operatives killed none of the leaders themselves,
William Colby, DCI at the time of the investigations, testified
that "i]t wasn't for want of trying. 236
Two plots were expressly conceived by the United States and
were designed to assassinate foreign leaders. In 1960, after the
Republic of the Congo won its independence from Belgium, Presi-
dent Eisenhower expressed his concern at a NSC meeting that
230. Id. at 1.
231. See id. at 3.
232. Id. at 4-5. Aside from these principal investigations, the Committee received evi-
dence of CIA involvement in plots to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia and
"Papa Doc" Duvalier of Haiti. Id. at 4 n.1. The Committee also found that there may have
been a "generalized assassination capability," authorized by ranking officials within the
CIA. Id. at 5.
233. See RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 336, 344-45.
234. See id. at 345. The Church Committee also investigated allegations that the CIA
had attempted to assassinate Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser in 1957 and Chinese leader
Chou En-lai in 1955. See id. at 766 n.55. Neither plot could be confirmed by the Commit-
tee. Id.
235. See id. at 336.
236. Id.; see also CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 256.
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the new government of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba could
become a Cold War pawn of the Soviet Union.237 DCI Allen Dulles
construed the President's concern as authority to assassinate
Lumumba. 2" By August 1960, Dulles sent a cable to the CIA sta-
tion chief in Africa instructing subordinates in the agency to
assassinate Lumumba 9.2 " Although poisons were delivered to the
Congo and some steps were taken to obtain access to the Prime
Minister for the CIA-trained assassins,24 ° Lumumba was killed by
rivals inthe Congo in early 1961-apparently without the in-
volvement of the United States.241 The Church Committee found
that the evidence supported "a reasonable inference" that Eisen-
hower had authorized the plan to kill Lumumba, but the Commit-
tee backed off that conclusion in the face of countervailing state-
ments and ambiguity in the records.242
Between 1960 and 1965, at least eight plots were hatched in
the United States to kill Fidel Castro.243 Operatives included fig-
ures from the underworld, disaffected Cubans, and others.244
Support was provided by the United States.245
In January and March of 1960, a subcommittee of the Special
Group first discussed assassinating Castro.246 These meetings led
to a cloaked discussion of the topic in the NSC, with the President
presiding. 247 After the debacle at the Bay of Pigs, renewed efforts
to kill Castro were made-likely at the urging of Attorney Gen-
eral Robert Kennedy and possibly of the President, as an adjunct
to the larger covert Operation Mongoose. 24" The failed plots
reached absurd levels-a seashell rigged to explode as Castro
swam over it, a planned gift to Castro of a diving suit treated
with a fungus and its regulator contaminated with tubercula ba-
237. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 15-16.
238. See id. at 15.
239. See id. at 15-16. One NSC staffer testified that President Eisenhower ordered the
Lumumba killing at an NSC meeting a few days in advance of the Dulles cable. Id. at 15
n. 1.
240. Id. at 26-33.
241. Id. at 49-50.
242. Id. at 263; see also PRADOS, supra note 128, at 233-35.
243. PRADOS, supra note 128, at 181-83.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 176-77.
247. Id. at 177.
248. Id. at 212.
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cillus, and a ballpoint pen built with a hypodermic needle so fine
that Castro literally would not know what hit him.2 49 The at-
tempts continued until President Kennedy was assassinated.25 °
The campaign against Castro was driven from the White House,
in part to avoid briefing DCI John McCone, an opponent of
assassinations.251 Conflicting testimony and memory lapses
among key participants led the Church Committee to find
"insufficient evidence" that a President, senior advisers, or the
Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro. 252
The third plot was initiated not by the United States directly,
but by a group supported by the United States that made clear its
intentions to kill Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.253 Be-
ginning in 1961, the United States supported dissidents in the
Dominican Republic who were seeking to kill Trujillo.254 United
States officials supplied guns to the dissidents who later killed
Trujillo in 1961.255 The day before the assassination, a cable per-
sonally authorized by President Kennedy was sent to the Ameri-
can Consul General stating that the United States did not con-
done assassination. 256 The cable also made the inconsistent
statement that the United States continued to support the oppo-
sition group."' It is not clear whether the guns were knowingly
provided for use in the assassination, or whether any of the guns
were present at the assassination.258
During the fourth and fifth attempts the United States sup-
ported a change of government, but there is no evidence that U.S.
officials contemplated assassination. The United States sup-
ported toppling the Ngo Dinh Diem government of South Viet-
nam."' When the General's coup was carried out on November 2,
1963, the President and his brother were killed-apparently not
249. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 88-89.
250. See RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 390.
251. See id. at 387.
252. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 263.






259. See RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 433-34.
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as part of the coup plan and without the support or involvement
of the United States.26 °
In October 1970, Chilean Army commander in chief Rene
Schneider died from gunshot wounds suffered when he resisted a
kidnap attempt.26' Schneider was an obstacle to the coup that the
United States supported to prevent Salvador Allende from taking
office as the elected President of Chile.2 62 The United States pro-
vided money, guns, and other equipment to the coup plotters, but
apparently withdrew support from the group that carried out the
kidnapping attempt. 63 There is no evidence that the United
States was directly involved in any attempt to kill Schneider.2 64
C. Did the Practice of Plotting Assassinations Create Customary
Authority?
1. The Argument from Appropriations
In response to inquiries from Secretary of Defense James For-
restal concerning the authority of the CIA to engage in covert op-
erations, a September 25, 1947 memorandum from CIA General
Counsel Houston concluded that the National Security Act did
not authorize the CIA to conduct covert operations, except to the
extent that such operations were "related to intelligence affecting
the national security."26 5 When the DCI expressed dissatisfaction
with the legal opinion, Houston produced a second memoran-
dum.2 66 Houston opined that "'if the President, with his constitu-
tional responsibilities for the conduct of foreign policy, gave the
agency appropriate instructions and if Congress gave it the funds
to carry them out, the agency had the legal capability of carrying
out the covert actions involved.'
267
260. See id. at 433-35; PRADOS, supra note 128, at 245-47.
261. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 5.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.; See also PRADOS, supra note 128, at 318 (finding that the CIA encouraged the
assassination of Schneider until about a week before the kidnapping).
265. PRADOS, supra note 128, at 27.
266. Id. at 27-28.
267. Id. (quoting General Counsel Lawrence R. Houston).
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By 1948, the CIA was engaged in covert operations, and the
President had approved the first NSC directives prescribing the
procedures pertinent to such actions.26 When the administration
sought and obtained enactment of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, its "clear purpose ... was to protect the secu-
rity of secret operations." '269 The 1949 Act facilitates CIA secrecy
by authorizing agency spending outside the traditional legal re-
quirements for accounting and disclosure of public funds.27° In-
stead, CIA funds are secretly transferred to the agency from other
agencies-a sort of shell game designed to hide intelligence
spending from U.S. adversaries.27' However, as the Church Com-
mittee later found, although the House Committee on Armed
Services may have known that covert operation plans were pend-
ing at the time of considering the 1949 bill, "[t]here [was] no evi-
dence that the full Congress ... knew or understood the range
of... covert action which the Executive was undertaking."272 In
other words, enactment of the 1949 Act may have constituted au-
thorization for some secret activities, but not covert action.
Over the years it has been argued that congressional appro-
priation of funds for CIA activities constitutes a ratification of
past activities or acquiescence in ongoing activities. 3 The courts
have created only a rule of narrow construction, that ratification
by appropriation is disfavored absent clear evidence that Con-
gress knew of or acquiesced in a precise course of executive con-
duct.274 But analysis of Congress's acquiescence is complicated be-
cause "legislative history for national security appropriations [is]
likely to be shallow and confused" due to the often truncated leg-
islative process that produced the money. 5 These tendencies are
268. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 133.
269. Id.
270. See 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (2000).
271. See id.; see also DYCUS ET AL., supra note 11.
272. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 133.
273. See id. (citations omitted).
274. See, e.g., Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Harris, 618 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir.
1980) (finding that the government failed to show that Congress either intended its spe-
cific appropriations to preclude California Indians from receiving other IHS funds, or was
aware of any IHS policy to that effect); City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 672
(9th Cir. 1978) (noting that ratification by appropriation will not be found unless the gov-
ernment has sustained the heavy burden of demonstrating congressional knowledge of the
precise course of action alleged to have been acquiesced).
275. WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE
POWER OF THE PURSE 112 (1994).
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only enhanced by the secretive nature of the appropriations proc-
ess for intelligence spending.276 Because Congress as a whole ap-
propriates funds for the CIA without knowing, much less approv-
ing, of specific uses of the funds, "the appropriation must plainly
show a purpose to bestow the precise authority which is claimed"
in order to constitute acquiescence. 7 If the required showing is
made, courts will find that an appropriation for an executive ac-
tion constitutes ratification of the action.278 There must be evi-
dence that Congress knows and intends that the agency action in
question is within the appropriated program,279 and that "the
agency ha[s] at least an arguable legal basis for its action."28 °
The Church Committee mistakenly concluded that Congress
had not ratified CIA covert operations by appropriating funds for
them because "Congress as a whole ha[d] never voted for appro-
priations for [them] ."211 Although the CIA obtains its funds
through a secretive set of budget transfers from other agencies,
the funds are appropriated funds that are approved by Congress
"as a whole," pursuant to a statutory arrangement that Congress
approved in 1949.282 Nonetheless, the ratification claims made by
276. See 50 U.S.C. § 403j(b) (2000).
277. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 n.24 (1944); see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978) (holding that absent both congressional awareness of construc-
tion of the Endangered Species Act which would effectively repeal it with respect to Tellico
Dam and explicit language removing dam from scope of statute, appropriation of funds for
dam did not constitute implied repeal of the statute); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 610 F.2d 581,
585 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated by Sierra Club v. Watt, 451 U.S. 965 (1981) (deciding that ap-
propriations act constituted authorization for pumping plant as Congress had knowledge
of the precise project at issue and was explicitly and specifically addressing that project);
Libby Rod & Gun Club v. Poteat, 594 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that appro-
priations act did not confer statutorily required authorization for construction of dam as
there was no evidence that Congress had affirmatively addressed itself to the issue of au-
thorization or was even aware of it).
278. See, e.g., Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947)
(opining that contemporaneous and consistent construction by the chief executive is enti-
tled to great weight by the judiciary); Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 361 (1941) (noting
that repeated appropriations of funds raised by administration practice with congressional
knowledge of that practice constituted ratification of executive branch practice); Is-
brandtsen-Moller Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 147 (1937) (indicating that Congress
ratified the President's actions by passing appropriation acts that covered the Department
of Commerce's necessary salaries and expenses); Wells v. Nickles, 104 U.S. 444, 447 (1881)
(explaining that authority from Congress to support the Department of Interior's timber-
protection policy may be fairly inferred from appropriations made to pay for the agents).
279. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 610 F.2d at 601-02.
280. See 1 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 1 PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIA-
TIONS LAW 2-54 (2d ed. 1991).
281. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 134.
282. Id.
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defenders of the agency are wide of the mark due to the absence
of notice to Congress before the congressional investigations of
the covert operations-the assassination plots in particular-and
to the failure of the appropriations to "plainly show a purpose to
bestow the precise authority" claimed. 83
2. The More General Argument for Acquiescence
Still, the Church Committee found that "in recent years [Con-
gress] has been aware that funds for [covert] operations were be-
ing channeled to the CIA."2 4 Because Congress could have ended
the operations by attaching conditions to the appropriations,
"[t]he failure to exercise this power may be interpreted as con-
gressional ratification of CIA authority."" 5 This conclusion is
closer to, though still wide of, the mark.
The CIA involvement in assassination in the years before 1974
may or may not have been a "systematic, unbroken, executive
practice, long pursued."2" 6 The Fifth Function is sufficiently open-
ended to "enable, if not invite" executive initiative.2"' For the pur-
poses of establishing customary law, however, the practice breaks
down because it cannot be said that congressional acquiescence
was knowing. The system for congressional oversight of CIA ac-
tivities, including covert operations, helped assure that Congress
as a whole did not know what the CIA was doing.
After 1947, the Armed Services and Appropriations Commit-
tees of the House and Senate were given formal oversight respon-
sibility for CIA activities and spending.28 8 In the Senate, CIA sub-
committees were created within the two committees.28 9 Yet the
tendency during the relevant period was not to question agency
activities, as Senator Leverett Saltonstall explained in 1956:
[I]t is not a question of reluctance on the part of the CIA officials to
speak to us. Instead, it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to
283. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 303 n.24 (1944).
284. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 134.
285. Id.
286. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
287. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
288. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 149.
289. Id.
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seek information and knowledge on subjects which I personally, as a
member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have, unless I
believed it to be my responsibility to have it because it might involve
the lives of American citizens.
290
As the Church Committee later determined, oversight of CIA
activities was largely a function of personal relationships between
committee chairmen and the DCI.291 The agency talked to its
"friends" in Congress who exercised political influence on matters
important to the agency.192 The CIA subcommittees received only
episodic and general information about covert operations.293 In-
stead, Senator Richard Russell, one of the most powerful senators
in the 1950s and 1960s, formed an unofficial committee of the
committee chairmen with oversight responsibility of the CIA and
other influential insiders, including Clark Clifford.2 94 Russell used
the informal committee to receive reports on CIA activities and to
prevent any real oversight of agency operations.2 95 Before the in-
vestigations of the 1970s, the system "worked because the agency
was trusted, its directors were respected, and it was seen as being
America's principal defense against the subterranean machina-
tions of world communism."2 96 There is no evidence that any
member of Congress was informed under this system, before or
after the fact, that the CIA participated in plots to assassinate
foreign leaders.297 Thus, the CIA activities of the 1950s, 1960s,
and early 1970s cannot be supported by customary law.
D. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974
As President Nixon attempted to contain the growing Water-
gate scandal in 1973-including allegations that he employed the
CIA for political purposes-DCI James Schlesinger was ap-
pointed Secretary of Defense and William Colby was named by
the President as the new DCI.295 In the midst of growing public
290. 102 Cong. Rec. S5924 (1956) (statement of Sen. Saltonstall).
291. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 150.
292. See id.
293. See id. at 150-51.
294. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 282.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 281.
297. See id.
298. WILLIAM COLBY & PETER FORBATH, HONORABLE MEN: MY LIFE IN THE CIA 343
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and media attention to Watergate, departing DCI Schlesinger
and nominee Colby prepared a directive to senior officials at the
CIA ordering them to report to the DCI "'any activities now going
on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to
be outside the legislative charter of this agency."'299 The "skele-
tons list," as it was referred to in the agency, ran 693 pages and
included an entire range of "dirty tricks," including the assassina-
tion plots against Lumumba, Castro, and Trujillo. °° Colby then
publicly revealed the "skeletons" in his confirmation hearings.30'
However, it was the covert operation in Chile that most di-
rectly prompted Congress to change the oversight rules for the
CIA.3"2 Efforts by the United States to support anti-communist
forces in Chile date to the 1950s and reflect the Cold War rival-
ries with the Soviet Union for influence around the world.'0 ' After
Marxist and other leftist parties gained elective office in 1964 and
again in 1970,304 the CIA instigated a coup in 1970 to prevent left-
ist Salvador Allende from taking office as president.0 5 The groups
of plotters agreed that kidnapping Army Commander Rene
Schneider would be essential to the success of any coup, because
Schneider was publicly committed to following constitutional
processes.3 6 The CIA withdrew its support from the group that
eventually killed Schneider in the kidnapping attempt.'0 '
In 1973, the CIA was aware that another coup was planned,
did not discourage the plotters, and knew that the junta of Gen-
eral Pinochet was engaged in a campaign of human rights abuses
in the months after Allende's government was overthrown. 30 8
During the 1970 period, President Nixon ordered the CIA not to
reveal its activities in Chile to the relevant NSC committee, the
(1978).
299. Id. at 338 (quoting Memorandum from James Schlesinger to CIA employees (May
9, 1973)).
300, RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 556-57 (citing memorandum from William V. Broe,
Inspector General, to William Colby, incoming DCI (May 21, 1973)).
301. Id. at 555-57.
302. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV'T OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., COVERT ACTION IN CHILE: 1963-1973, at 49 (Comm. Print 1975)
[hereinafter COVERT ACTION IN CHILE].
303. See id. at 4.
304. Id. at 5.
305. Id. at 23.
306. See RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 517.
307. COVERT ACTION IN CHILE, supra note 302, at 26.
308, Id. at 39.
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State or Defense Departments, or the ambassador in Chile.3 °9 The
Church Committee later found that, of the thirty-three covert ac-
tion projects approved by the NSC committee for Chile between
1963 and 1974, only eight were briefed in some fashion to Con-
gress.
310
After the American press reported on CIA activities in Chile,
these covert operations, along with Watergate and reports of CIA
activities in Southeast Asia, served to focus additional attention
on the CIA.311 In response, Congress acted to formalize by statute
the oversight of CIA activities even before the Church Committee
and related investigations documented the CIA involvement in
assassination. Passed on December 30, the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 provided:
No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act
may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency
for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended
solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the
President finds that each such operation is important to the national
security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a de-
scription and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees
of the Congress .... 
312
The Hughes-Ryan Amendment worked a major change in the
relationship between Congress and the CIA, forcing an explicit
role for congressional committees in reviewing proposals for cov-
ert action, including any support for assassination. 13 Hughes-
Ryan added the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committees to the four committees that already had CIA
oversight responsibility.314 In addition, Hughes-Ryan ended the
practice of plausible denial for the President, at least in his rela-
tions with Congress.3 15 Requiring the President's approval was
309. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 515-16.
310. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 150-51.
311. See SCOTT BRECKENRIDGE, THE CIA AND THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 264-65
(1986).
312. Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. 1975)).
313. See id.
314. BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 311, at 266. The seventh and eighth committees were
added to the Church Committee investigations when each house established a special
committee for oversight of intelligence.
315. FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 58 (1976) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT] ("The concept of plausible denial ... is dead.").
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also intended to enhance the internal review of proposals in the
executive branch and to force the President carefully to review
each proposal.316
Ironically, however, Hughes-Ryan may also be read to author-
ize covert operations. Although the animating purpose of Con-
gress was to improve intelligence oversight and to reign in
abuses,317 Representative Holtzman warned during floor debates
that the amendment would permit the CIA "to subvert or under-
mine foreign governments."31 After enactment, CIA special coun-
sel Mitchell Rogovin maintained that the amendment "clearly
implies that the CIA is authorized to plan and conduct covert ac-
tion." '319 The Church Committee maintained that "[o]n its face
[Hughes-Ryan] contributes nothing to the CIA's authority to do
anything.""32 Hughes-Ryan does not explicitly authorize covert
operations, but the amendment surely "contributes" to recogni-
tion by Congress that authority for covert action exists, support-
ing the dynamic construction of the Fifth Function to allow such
action and the inference of congressional acquiescence. At a mini-
mum, by recognizing that the CIA acts in ways other than
collecting foreign intelligence, Congress did not foreclose covert
operations. It merely required that the executive follow pre-
scribed procedures in carrying out the operations without also re-
quiring prior notice to Congress-much less approval by Congress
of such operations.
If Hughes-Ryan formally acknowledged that covert operations
could be conducted according to law, did the acknowledgement in-
clude assassination? The new procedures required by Hughes-
Ryan clearly applied to all activities undertaken pursuant to
Fifth Function authority. Textually, "operations in foreign coun-
tries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary
316. CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, COVERT OPERATIONS AND THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR 38-39 (Alex Whit-
ing ed., 1987).
317. Senator Hughes and others in Congress viewed Hughes-Ryan as the first step in a
reform process, as the reports generated under Hughes-Ryan would tell Congress what
controls to impose. See 120 Cong. Rec. 33, 488-89 (1974) (statements of Sen. Hughes); Id.
at 33, 490-91 (statements of Sen. Baker and Sen. Symington).
318. 120 CONG. REC. 39,165 (1974).
319. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence:
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 1737 (1976) (statement of
Mitchell Rogovin, Special Counsel to the DCI).
320. FINAL REPORT, supra note 315, at 135.
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intelligence," include assassination.321 Even though there was no
contemporaneous notice or even informal acknowledgement to
Congress that the CIA was involved in assassination plots or ac-
tivities, the "skeletons list" discussed by DCI Colby in his 1973
confirmation hearings included references to the Lumumba, Cas-
tro, and Trujillo plots.3 22 After the CIA involvement in coup plot-
ting and the death of Schneider in Chile, Senator Abourezk pro-
posed a ban on all covert operations.323 In floor debate on his
defeated bill, Abourezk stated that this intention was to foreclose
covert operations "which result in assassinations. 324 Although
Hughes-Ryan should not be read to ratify or authorize activities
that Congress does not know about, it is reasonable to impute
knowledge of CIA involvement in assassination to Congress by
December 1974.325 The dynamic construction of the Fifth Function
permitted the development of customary law to support the covert
action capability, in part because Congress was informed at least
generally concerning such activities. Its knowing acquiescence
may extend to targeted killing.
E. The Lopez-Lima Decision
The potential scope of the Fifth Function was recognized in a
1990 federal court decision, United States v. Lopez-Lima. 326 Re-
inaldo Juan Lopez-Lima and Enrique Castillo-Hernandez hi-
jacked a plane to Cuba in 1964 and were subsequently indicted in
absentia for air piracy.32 7 Almost twenty years later, Lopez-Lima
returned to the United States where he was prosecuted after au-
thorities realized that he was under indictment.3 2' At his trial,
however, Lopez-Lima made a "CIA defense"-asserting that he
and his associate were CIA operatives hired to hijack the plane
and pose as defectors to Cuba.329 When he sought discovery of
classified information to establish this defense, the court had to
321. Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1795, 1804 (1974)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2422 (Supp. 1975)).
322. RANELAGH, supra note 129, at 555-57.
323. 120 CONG. REC. S33,477 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1974) (statement of Sen. Abourezk).
324. Id.
325. See supra Part V.C.2.
326. 738 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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rule on whether the CIA has the "real authority" to order a hi-
jacking in violation of federal criminal law in order to determine
whether Lopez-Lima could reasonably rely on such authority and
therefore whether such discovery was relevant.33 °
The court first noted that the Church Committee had made ex-
tensive findings of intelligence activities that violated policy and
law up until 1964 and beyond.331 It then found authority for these
practices in the National Security Act of 1947, concluding that
the Fifth Function supplied "the broad, nonspecific grant of
power" that enabled the various NSC directives reviewed above,
including 5412, the one in effect in 1964.332 The court read the di-
rective to impose no requirement for compliance with U.S. law
and therefore to give the CIA "the real authority to authorize a
hijacking to Cuba, as one of its 'deception plans and opera-
tions.' 333 Finally, the court considered Executive Order 12,333, 334
which provided in 1981 that "[n]othing in this Order shall be con-
strued to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or
statutes of the United States. 335 Reasoning that nothing compa-
rable to this provision was in effect in 1964, the court found that
the CIA was not precluded explicitly from authorizing Lopez-
Lima to hijack a plane to Cuba.336 Accordingly, Lopez-Lima was
entitled to show that he reasonably relied on the authorization he
claimed to have received. 337 The court's decision represents addi-
tional evidence of CIA authority to engage in otherwise unlawful
acts, possibly including targeted killing, at least in 1964. The au-
thority was based in the Fifth Function, and the court not only
found the authorization, but applied it to actions occurring in the
United States.338
330. Id. at 1408; see also Lauren Weiner, Hijack Charge Erased, Cuban Must Face INS,
WASH. TIMES, June 25, 1990, at A9.
331. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. at 1409.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1410 (quoting NSC Directive 5412).
334. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2000).
335. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. at 1410.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 1413.
338. Id.
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F. The Church Committee and a Proposed Charter for the
Intelligence Community
Although DCIs Richard Helms and William Colby issued direc-
tives in 1972 and 1973 to CIA officials banning assassination,
suspicion about past CIA activities continued in 1974."' 9 In De-
cember, press reports detailed a massive CIA operation carried
out against American opponents of the Vietnam War, including
mail intercepts, wiretapping, and break-ins.34° When DCI Colby
submitted a thirty-page report to National Security Adviser
Henry Kissinger and President Ford detailing, among other
things, the CIA assassination plots against Castro, Diem,
Trujillo, and Lumumba, the President responded by announcing a
commission to investigate domestic abuses, to be chaired by Vice
President Nelson Rockefeller. 41 Congress soon established its
own investigation; the Senate creating the Select Committee to
Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Ac-
tivities, chaired by Senator Frank Church, and the House creat-
ing the Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Representa-
tive Otis Pike.342 The Church Committee then investigated the
alleged assassination plots involving the CIA, and in November
1975 issued the interim report.343
The Committee made findings about the CIA decision process
and about policy, finding confusion, ambiguity, and disarray.
3 44
The record showed breakdowns in communication between opera-
tives and superiors and failures by officials who authorized assas-
sinations to check their assumptions: (1) that assassination was a
permissible policy option; and (2) that such operations could be
mounted without express authorization.345 Senior agency officials
did not guide the field agents, and those agents did not know
their limits. 3
46
Although the Committee was reporting after Hughes-Ryan
ended the practice of plausible denial, the interim report stated
339. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 282.
340. See PRADOS, supra note 128, at 326-27.
341. See id. at 326-33.
342. Id. at 334.
343. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209.
344. See id. at 261.
345. Id. at 261-67.
346. Id. at 264-67.
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that
the extension of the doctrine to the internal decision-making process
of the Government is absurd. Any theory which ... places elected of-
ficials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invita-
tion to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of de-
mocratic government. The doctrine is the antithesis of
accountability. 
347
Plausible denial was often accomplished by using euphemisms
to shield senior officials from accountability and to enable lower
officials to avoid having to confront the enormity of targeted kill-
ing.348 Generalized instructions, along with the perception that,
once approved, the instructions to act carried over from one ad-
ministration to the next, also thwarted careful review of proposed
operations.349
The Committee also found that "assassination violates moral
precepts fundamental to our way of life," and that assassination
is not an acceptable foreign policy tool.35° However, the Commit-
tee recognized that the death of a foreign leader could result from
an operation that would not involve assassination, and it reserved
its strongest criticisms for the Castro and Lumumba operations,
where assassination was the express goal of the CIA.351 Finally,
the Committee proposed a bill to make assassination a felony. 352
In its final report on its overall charge to investigate the intel-
ligence community issued in April 1976, the Church Committee
considered but rejected a proposal endorsing "a total ban on all
forms of covert action." '353 However, the Committee concluded that
the Hughes-Ryan injunction that covert operations be found "im-
portant to the national security of the United States" was insuffi-
ciently strict and that "covert action must be seen as an excep-
347. Id. at 277-78.
348. Id. at 278.
349. Id. at 278-79.
350. Id. at 257.
351. Id. at 257-58 ("The possibility of assassination.., is one of the issues to be con-
sidered in determining the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particularly in
those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.")
352. Id. app. A at 289.
353. FINAL REPORT, supra note 315, at 159.
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tional act, to be undertaken only when the national security re-
quires it and when overt means will not suffice."354
VI. EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 11,905 AND ITS PROGENY
A. Executive Order No. 11,905
The criminal ban on assassination proposed by the Church
Committee was never enacted. Instead, President Ford pre-
empted it with a ban of his own.355 During the Church Committee
investigations, he had already publicly stated his opposition to
"political assassination., 356 One week after the Committee com-
pleted the report containing the assassination bill, he asserted
that he had issued specific instructions that "under no circum-
stances" should any government agency "participate in or plan for
any assassination of a foreign leader" during his presidency.357
When Ford subsequently issued Executive Order No. 11,905-in
apparent response to the leak of the Committee's report on assas-
sination 35 -the order's "Prohibition on Assassination" cut a
somewhat narrower swath: "No employee of the United States
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political
assassination." '359 Although searches for legislative history of the
order have drawn a blank,36° the close proximity in time between
the order and the leak of the Church Committee assassination
report strongly suggests that it was intended to forestall enact-
ment of the Committee's bill. Absent contrary legislative history,
we contend that the order can be reasonably interpreted by refer-
ence to the Church bill,361 which yields three important conclu-
sions about the order's scope.
354. Id. at 159-60.
355. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
356. 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 661 (June 9, 1975).
357. 1975 Pub. Papers 1902, 1905; see Brandenburg, supra note 71, at 684-85 n.190
(listing news conferences and letters at which Ford stated his policy).
358. Johnson, supra note 11, at 408.
359. See Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5(g), 3 C.F.R. 90, 101 (1976) (emphasis added).
360. Fredman, supra note 11, at 16.
361. It also seems reasonable to interpret it no more restrictively than the proposal it
preempted. See Schmitt, supra note 11, at 663. But see Zengel, supra note 11, at 635-36
(asserting that the order's ambiguity has invited more restrictive interpretations).
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First, by prohibiting "political assassination" the order prohib-
its the assassination of foreign officials for their political views,
actions, or statements, tracking the Church bill. 362 The bill de-
fined "foreign official" as "a Chief of State or political equivalent,
President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Premier, Foreign Min-
ister, Ambassador, or other officer, employee, or agent" of a for-
eign government or of a "foreign political group, party, military
force, movement or other association." 63 The order therefore only
prohibited the targeting of such foreign officials for their political
views or actions-on ideological grounds, in other words-as were
the targets of assassination plots that the Church Committee had
investigated. The Committee never reached the question whether
targeted killing for reasons of self-defense was unlawful, probably
because no one advanced this justification for the CIA's assassi-
nation plots. 3 4 Yet it stressed that "the assassination plots were
not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States"6 ' as
its lead conclusion under the heading, "[tlhe setting in which the
assassination plots occurred explains, but does not justify them. 366
This formulation plainly suggests the negative implication that
"imminent danger" might "justify" them. 367 A targeted killing of a
foreign official in self-defense against continuing terrorist attacks
or in anticipatory self-defense against imminent or impossible-to-
repel attacks would not be undertaken "because of [that] official's
political views, actions, or statements '368 but, rather, because the
United States deemed it necessary to defend itself against attack.
Such a killing would therefore not constitute "political assassina-
tion."36
9
Second, the order's prohibition should be read to apply only to
officials "of a foreign government with which the United States is
not at war pursuant to a declaration of war or against which
United States Armed Forces have not been introduced into hos-
362. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, app. A at 289.
363. Id. app. A, § 1118(e)(2), at 289-90.
364. Sofaer, supra note 14, at 119.
365. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 258.
366. Id.
367. See id.
368. Id. app. A, § 1118(a), at 289.
369. But see Jules Lobel, The United States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign
Affairs Rights-Here and There, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 871, 879 n.45 (1989) (arguing that the
Church Committee drew no exceptions but left the President to act at his own peril "where
such an action represented an 'indispensable necessity' to the life of the nation ....").
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tilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers
Resolution," as the Church Committee bill put it." ° Significantly,
that resolution acknowledges constitutional authority in the
President to use armed force in "a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its
armed forces," in addition to situations of declared war or statu-
torily authorized hostilities."' The Church Committee bill's ex-
ception reflected the Committee's recognition that the applicable
legal framework in wartime is provided by the law of armed con-
flict, with its own definition of assassination and its expanded
tolerance of targeted killing.37 2 Nothing in the executive order
shows that it was intended to supplant that legal framework
when armed conflict has been constitutionally authorized; indeed,
the order is titled "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities"
and states that it is intended "to clarify the authority and respon-
sibilities of the intelligence departments," not the military.7 3
Thus, even though the order's prohibition is not framed narrowly,
it can reasonably be interpreted as supplying the legal framework
only when the country is not in armed conflict by reason of a dec-
laration of war, a statute consistent with the War Powers Resolu-
tion, or a national emergency created by an attack.374
Third, in prohibiting political assassination by executive order
the President did not ban such killing absolutely, he only insisted
that it could not lawfully be undertaken without his approval. 5
Although an executive order is binding on members of the execu-
tive branch (as long as it is not contrary to other law),376 it can be
370. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, app. A, § 1118(e)(2), at 289 (empha-
sis added).
371. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c)(3) (2000).
372. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, app. A at 289.
373. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976) (emphasis added).
374. Cf. Anderson, supra note 11, at 314 (urging that the order not be interpreted to
apply in wartime, without noting the limitation of the Church bill).
375. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 676 ("[I]nstead of being an absolute ban on assassi-
nation, the order reserves the right to mandate such an action solely to the President.");
accord Zengel, supra note 11, at 637.
376. See Peter Raven-Hansen, Making Agencies Follow Orders: Judicial Review of
Agency Violations of Executive Order 12,291, 1983 DUKE L.J. 285, 297-301. The General
Accounting Office has claimed that orders which are issued without statutory authority do
not have the force and effect of law. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE USE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES TO MAKE AND IMPLEMENT U.S. POLICY GAO/NSIAD 92-72, at 1
(1992). However, this statement ignores orders for which the President has inherent con-
stitutional authority or customary authority in which Congress has acquiesced, such as
orders involving national security, intelligence, and targeted killing rest, in part, on the
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changed or revoked by the President, unlike a statute.377 Thus, if
the President could prohibit political assassination, he could also
allow it-by lifting that ban-unless other legal authorities or po-
litical considerations forbid him from doing so. 37' This result was
surely not contemplated by the Church Committee, but is, in fact,
one which addresses one of the Committee's principal concerns:
the accountability-destroying prevalence of "plausible denial"
within the government.3 79 The Committee found that
THE APPARENT LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM [OF THE CIA] WAS SUCH
THAT ASSASSINATION PLOTS COULD HAVE BEEN
UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION.
Whether or not the Presidents in fact knew about the assassina-
tion plots, and even if their subordinates failed in their duty of full
disclosure, it still follows that the Presidents should have known
about the plots. This sets a demanding standard, but one the Com-
mittee supports.
38 0
latter forms of authority. See supra Part I.
377. Raven-Hansen, supra note 376, at 298. Although executive orders are usually sent
to the Attorney General "for his consideration as to both form and legality," 1 C.F.R. §
19.2(b) (2001), and then must be published in the Federal Register, 44 U.S.C. § 1505(a)
(2000), there is no magic in the form of presidential lawmaking. See U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum on Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive,
as Compared to an Executive Order, (Jan. 29, 2000) [hereinafter OLC Memorandum],
available at 2000 O.L.C. LEXIS 4. In fact, most executive national security orders have
taken the form of National Security Directives, National Security Decision Directives, or
Presidential Decision Directives, depending on the administration. See DYCUS ET. AL., su-
pra note 10, at 49-50 n.2. Furthermore, as we discuss below, even a written "presidential
finding," pursuant to the intelligence oversight legislation, may constitute a "constructive
rescission" of prior inconsistent presidential orders. See Pickard, supra note 18, at 29;
Zengel, supra note 11, at 637. Moreover, these forms of national security law are typically
classified. DYcUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 50; cf. Brandenburg, supra note 71, at 687
n.203. We believe, therefore, that the President could lawfully rescind or change his own
order secretly. It is doubtful, however, that he could violate it without changing or rescind-
ing it. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974).
378. See Zengel, supra note 11, at 637. Zengel writes that
the executive order constitutes a statement-albeit an ambiguous one-of
administrative policy, made in a manner that precludes, or makes very diffi-
cult, changes in that policy without prior consultation with Congress. At-
tempts to narrow the definition are actually efforts to exclude certain acts
from those that the President has assured Congress he will not undertake
and are seen by many as a surreptitious attempt to narrow the scope of that
assurance.
Id. at 637.
379. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 261.
380. Id.
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By forbidding political assassination, President Ford helped
meet that standard because government agents who proposed
such killing would be required to ask him to lift the ban to make
their acts lawful.381
B. Executive Order No. 12,036
Congressional efforts to enact a ban on assassination did not
end with the Church Committee bill. In 1976, a bill was intro-
duced providing that "whoever, except in time of war, while en-
gaged in the duties of an intelligence operation of the government
of the United States, willfully kills any person shall be impris-
oned."" 2 Though the bill went nowhere, two years later President
Jimmy Carter-who came to office promising that "moral princi-
ples" would guide his administration3 3-re-issued the ban on as-
sassination without the modifier "political."" 4 Did this deletion
expand the ban, and if so, how? Here again, there is no legislative
history to resolve the question.
Logically, the deletion of the restrictive modifier expands the
ban. Thus, one scholar concludes: "the assassination prohibition
itself may not be interpreted solely with respect to the specific
cases that underlay its first enunciation in 1975; because of the
change in 1978 from 'political assassination' to 'assassination,'
whether a particular death might be construed as a political kill-
ing cannot be the only criterion."3"5
Consequently, another scholar concludes that the 1978 ban
prohibited killing "anyone for any purpose whatsoever."8 6 This
construction would also be consistent with the 1976 bill which
criminalized the killing of "any person," although the two-year lag
381. See Executive Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
382. H.R. 15,542, 94th Cong. § 9(1) (1976).
383. JIMMY CARTER, KEEPING FAITH: MEMOIRS OF A PRESIDENT 143 (1982); see Dorian
D. Greene, Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Intelligence Agency Counsel, 2 TuLSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 91, 103 (1994).
384. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978). Carter also clarified the applicability
of the ban to persons employed on behalf of the United States. See infra notes 516-20 and
accompanying text.
385. Fredman, supra note 11, at 23; accord Schmitt, supra note 11, at 663.
386. Newman & Van Geel, supra note 11, at 433.
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between the bill and the order casts doubts on efforts to interpret
the latter by reference to the former. 87
Alternatively, the omission may simply have been an insignifi-
cant88 editing change based on a belief that "a political assassi-
nation" was a redundancy. Carter's Attorney General, Griffin
Bell, reported that Carter rejected earlier drafts as "incompre-
hensible, redundant, wordy and full of intelligence jargon
wrapped in legalisms."389 Only after the draftsmen shortened the
original draft by one-third did Carter sign it.39° This account lends
support to the argument that Carter made no substantive change
to the executive ban on assassination.391 Furthermore, nothing in
the order reflected any retreat from the construction that would
make it inapplicable in wartime-an exception also preserved in
the 1976 bill.392 Despite its change in the original wording, the
1976 order still fell short of imposing an absolute ban on targeted
killing.
C. The Present Order: Executive Order No. 12,333
In 1981, President Ronald Reagan carried the Carter language
forward in Executive Order No. 12,333,"9' which remains in effect
as we write in mid-2002. 94 But in 1984, during a televised presi-
dential debate with Walter Mondale, Reagan asserted that the
CIA's preparation of an assassination manual was "in direct con-
travention of my own Executive Order, in December of 1981, that
we would have nothing to do with regard to political assassina-
tion."395 This post-enactment legislative history lends some
weight to the "redundancy" interpretation of the Carter change
387. But see Sofaer, supra note 14, at 119 n.62 (noting that the bill "might explain" the
change in the order).
388. Compare Pickard, supra note 18, at 26 (finding that the ban "was reissued without
significant change"), with Johnson, supra note 11, at 409 (ignoring the change altogether).
389. GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 103 (1982).
390. Id.
391. See Pickard, supra note 18, at 26; Zengel, supra note 11, at 635.
392. See Zengel, supra note 11, at 636.
393. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981).
394. O.L.C. Memorandum, supra note 377 ("[Blecause a presidential directive issues
from the Office of the Chief Executive, it would remain in force, unless otherwise specified,
pending any future presidential action.").
395. 1984 Presidential Debate Between the President and Former Vice President Wal-
ter F. Mondale, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1591, 1593 (Oct. 21, 1984) (emphasis
added).
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and takes us back to our interpretation of the original Ford
ban. 396 Moreover, the consistent defeat of more restrictive assas-
sination bills since the original 1976 order 397 may signify congres-
sional acquiescence in the narrower ban, if not also in the Presi-
dent's implied reservation of the policy option of targeted
killing.398
In light of the foregoing history of the successive executive or-
ders and the fragment of post-enactment history for the 1981 or-
der in effect today, does the latter apply to the proposed targeted
killings of terrorist leaders and despotic heads-of-state? The an-
swer turns on the following: (1) whether the target falls within
the group of persons protected by the order; (2) whether the tar-
geted killing takes place in armed conflict authorized by war or
statute; (3) even if not, whether the target was selected only for
his political views or to defend against continuing, imminent, or
impossible-to-repel attack; and finally, (4) even if the order would
otherwise apply, whether it has been waived or rescinded.
The first question is easily answered. Saddam Hussein,
Manuel Noriega, and Quaddafi all qualify as "foreign officials" by
the definition of the original Church Committee bill, and by im-
plication, of the order, as de jure or de facto heads of their respec-
tive states. 99 Osama bin Laden is (was) not the head of any state,
but he would still qualify as the "political equivalent" (term taken
from the bill) of a chief-of-state or at least as an agent of al-Qaida,
a foreign "political group" or "l[paralmilitary force."400
The second question is also easily answered, if the only qualify-
ing armed conflicts are those authorized by declaration or by a
statute conforming to the War Powers Resolution. While no war
has ever been declared during the life of the executive ban, Con-
gress has twice relevantly authorized armed conflict by conform-
ing statute.4 1 The Authorization for Use of Military Force
396. See supra Part VI.A.
397. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 410 n.57 (citing and quoting one such bill).
398. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 675-76; Zengel, supra note 11, at 634.
399. See Zengel, supra note 11, at 637-44.
400. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209 app. A, § 1118(e), at 289-90; see
also Jackson, supra note 11, at 677-78.
401. Se Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (authorizing the use of force
against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks); Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (Jan.
14, 1991) (authorizing the use of force against Iraq in the Gulf War). Congress also author-
ized deployment of armed forces to Lebanon in conformity with the War Powers Resolu-
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Against Iraq authorized the 1991 Gulf War." 2 During the Gulf
War, therefore, the law applicable to any proposed killing of Sad-
dam Hussein was the law of armed conflict, not the executive or-
der; this resolution "removed any legal obstacle that Executive
Order No. 12,333 placed on Saddam's assassination." °3 As most
(though not all) scholars have interpreted it, that law would have
authorized his killing by non-treacherous means during that
war.4 °4 However, while there may be legitimate debate about
when, precisely, the Gulf War concluded, few scholars could seri-
ously argue that the war-or Congress's authorization for it
(which focused on the use of armed force to implement the Secu-
rity Council Resolution calling for Iraq's withdrawal from Ku-
wait)40'-continues into 2002 .406
Congress, however, in conformity with the War Powers Resolu-
tion also authorized the use of "all necessary force and other
means" against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks and
those who aided them.40 7 If Iraq, at Hussein's direction, is among
them, then the executive order ban still does not apply to him to-
day. Equally important, the ban does not apply to the targeted
killing of bin Laden, who falls squarely in the cross-hairs of the
congressional authorization. 4" As we interpret the executive or-
der's exception for authorized war, however, that exception does
not extend to any conflict that the President might denominate as
"war" (as in the "war on terrorism" or "war on drugs"). The
Church Committee bill exempted only conflicts authorized by dec-
tion. See Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983).
402. Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat 3. The Authorization specifically stated the Congress
intended it "to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Id. § 2 (c)(1), 105 Stat. at 4.
403. Johnson, supra note 11, at 431; accord Anderson, supra note 11, at 311.
404. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 11. Of course, nothing in our interpretation of the
order, or our concededly limited understanding of the law of war, would justify also target-
ing Hussein's family or mistress, unless they also held governmental positions that made
them proper targets under the law of war. See Johnson, supra note 11, at 401 (noting the
Air Force Chief of Staff boasted that the United States would probably target Hussein and
his family and mistress in the event of war, remarks for which he was promptly fired).
405. Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2(a), 105 Stat. at 3.
406. Cf. Zengel, supra note 11, at 637-39 (noting that the legality of the authorization
of force that is required was clear from the present state of war).
407. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001).
408. See id.
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laration of war or a statute which satisfies the War Powers Reso-
lution.409
Nevertheless, the answer to the third question may supply an
alternate escape from the order for the targeted killing of such
terrorists, and an alternative ground for going after bin Laden, if
not Hussein. Since bin Laden, senior leaders in al-Qaida, or other
terrorists who have attacked the United States in the past and
who have the intent and capacity to do so in the future would be
targeted primarily to defend against continuing, imminent, and
otherwise impossible-to-repel attacks-and not just because of
their political views-their targeted killing would not be prohib-
ited under the order, as informed by the Church Committee bill
that it preempted. 1 Likewise, if the facts established a pattern of
attacks orchestrated by Hussein, his involvement in the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, or his intent and capacity to mount an attack
against the United States, its nationals, or its property with
weapons of mass destruction ("WMD") that could not be averted
by other means of defense or negotiation, killing him in anticipa-
tory self-defense would not violate the order by this interpreta-
tion.411 The problem here lies more in the proof than in the order.
We doubt that Iraqi involvement in the failed assassination plot
against former President George H.W. Bush nine years ago42 and
continuing support of Palestinian suicide bombers,1 3 is enough to
make out any continuing attack on the United States-
particularly when no proof has yet been made public establishing
present Iraqi capability, let alone intent, to use WMD against the
United States or its nationals.
There remains the question of whether the order, even if it ap-
plies to prohibit a particular targeted killing, has been waived or
rescinded. As we have previously argued, although the President
may not violate his own order while it is in effect, he may waive
or rescind it.414 Moreover, if he waives or rescinds the order to au-
thorize a targeted killing in anticipatory self-defense, he can ap-
propriately classify the waiver or rescission-as he has most Na-
409. CHURCH COMMITEE REPORT, supra note 209, app. A at 289.
410. See id.
411. See id.
412. See DYCUS ETAL., supra note 10, at 362-63.
413. See Lee Hockstader, Israel Sets Out Charges Arafat Supported Terror, WASH.
POST, May 6, 2002, at Al.
414. See supra notes 377-78 and accompanying text.
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tional Security Directives and presidential findings authorizing
covert operations.415
In fact, newspaper reports suggest that Presidents have done
so on at least three occasions. President Reagan is reported to
have made a secret presidential finding authorizing the use of le-
thal force to kill Quaddafi prior to the United States air raid on
Libya in 1984.416 President Clinton reportedly also authorized the
killing of bin Laden in 1998 prior to a U.S. missile attack on a
terrorist training camp in Afghanistan run by al-Qaida.417 More
recently, President Bush reportedly made a finding authorizing
targeted killing of bin Laden and his associates.418 At the time of
this writing, the scope and continued legal effect of such authori-
zations is unclear; one or more Presidents may have waived the
executive order more generally for targeted killing of terrorists.
VII. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TARGETED KILLINGS:
INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATION
President Ford preempted a statutory ban on assassination by
issuing Executive Order No. 11,905,419 but he could not altogether
avoid legislative regulation of covert activities.42 ° Although Con-
gress gave up on plans for an ambitious substantive charter for
the intelligence community, it at least imposed modest procedural
requirements as part of the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.421
As subsequently modified and supplemented by the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, this intelligence oversight
legislation has continuously regulated covert actions since
415. See infra Part VII.
416. See Bob Woodward & Walter Pincus, 1984 Order Gave CIA Latitude: Reagan's Se-
cret Move to Counter Terrorists Called "License to Kill," WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1988, at Al.
417. See James Risen, Bin Laden Was Target of Afghan Raid, U.S. Confirms, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1998, at A3 (reporting that President Clinton made a finding authorizing
covert lethal action against bin Laden's terrorist network after a White House legal review
found such action lawful under U.S. and international law).
418. See Barton Gellman, CIA Weighs "Targeted Killing" Missions: Administration Be-
lieves Restraints Do Not Bar Singling Out Individual Terrorists, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
2001, at Al.
419. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976); see also supra Part VI.A.
420. Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 407(b), 94 Stat. 1981
(Oct. 14, 1980) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413 (2000)).
421. Id.
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1980.422 Does it apply to targeted killings, and, if so, how? We
conclude that it not only applies, but impliedly authorizes such
killings when they are not prohibited by other U.S. law, provided
that the President makes a written finding authorizing the kill-
ing and reports the operation to the congressional intelligence
committees.
The 1980 oversight legislation required that the President keep
the intelligence committees "fully and currently informed" of
"significant anticipated intelligence activit[ies]," reserving au-
thority for the President to limit or possibly withhold prior notice
in "extraordinary circumstances."423 Although the 1980 Act did
not define "significant anticipated intelligence activities," it sub-
stituted this term for the term "[CIA] operations in foreign coun-
tries" in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment.424 The 1980 Act could
therefore reasonably be construed to encompass the latter, as well
as operations by other "departments, agencies, and other entities
of the United States involved in intelligence activities." '425 A forti-
ori, a targeted killing abroad carried out by or on behalf of the in-
telligence community would be a "significant anticipated intelli-
gence activity" that the President would have to authorize by
finding and report to the intelligence committees at some point.426
The 1991 Act left this general finding and reporting require-
ment essentially intact, but broadened it to include intelligence
activities by any part of the government, not just members of the
intelligence community.427 In addition, it added more specific re-
quirements for the regulation of "covert action," which it defined
as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where
it is intended that the role of the United States Government will
not be apparent or acknowledged publicly .... ,4 28 Because any
targeted killing by the United States would inevitably have the
purpose of influencing political or military conditions abroad (by
422. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 192-88, 105 Stat.
441 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 413-414 (2000)).
423. Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501(a), 94 Stat. at 1981.
424. Hughes-Ryan Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 32, 88 Stat. 1804 (1974),
amended by Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1981.
425. Pub. L. No. 96-450, § 501(a), 94 Stat. at 1981.
426. Id. § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 1981.
427. See id.; 50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)(1) (2000).
428. 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2000).
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removing a political or military threat), any targeted killing in
which the role of the U.S. government is intended to be concealed
or denied would qualify as a "covert action" under the 1991 Act.429
The 1991 Act requires the President to make a written finding,
determining that a covert action is "necessary to support identifi-
able foreign policy objectives of the United States and is impor-
tant to the national security of the United States," and specifying
the U.S. departments, agencies, or entities, and any third parties
not elements or agents of the U.S. government, who are author-
ized "to fund or otherwise participate in any significant way in
the covert action. '43° The Act thus removes any doubt that presi-
dential findings must be in writing-enhancing the accountability
that was one aim of the original finding requirement in Hughes-
Ryan-and focuses the required finding in part on funding, in be-
lated response to the creative financing of the Iran-Contra Affair
by which the Reagan Administration sought to avoid statutory
funding restrictions.431 In addition, the 1991 Act newly enforces
the finding requirement by prohibiting the use of funds appropri-
ated "or otherwise available" to the government for covert actions
"unless and until a Presidential finding" has been made in accor-
dance with its provisions. 32
Finally, the 1991 Act expressly requires the DCI and "the
heads of all departments, agencies, and entities of the United
States government involved in a covert action" to keep the intelli-
gence committees "fully and currently informed."433 Since they
must already be fully and currently informed of intelligence ac-
tivities-which, as we have seen, include targeted killings for
which United States responsibility is to be acknowledged-a no-
tice requirement ultimately applies to all targeted killings.434 On
the other hand, the 1991 Act preserves the loopholes of the origi-
nal 1980 Act: the President may limit notice to a small number of
congressional leaders in "extraordinary circumstances," and by
429. See id.
430. Id. § 413b(a)(4).
431. See DYCUS ETAL., supra note 10, at 473-508.
432. 50 U.S.C. § 414(c) (2000).
433. Id. § 413b(b) (2000).
434. See id.
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implication, withhold it altogether in rare cases, subject to subse-
quent reporting "in a timely fashion."435
So far, we have characterized the 1991 Act as entirely proce-
dural. But it also forbids the President for authorizing any covert
action "that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the
United States."43 Unlike the executive orders banning assassina-
tion, the Act therefore does not itself forbid "assassination" or
targeted killing; it merely cross-references other laws and thus
adds no new limitation on such acts.437 Indeed, read as a whole,
the Act authorizes targeted killing by the United States govern-
ment, whether the government's role is concealed or acknowl-
edged, as long as it is not otherwise prohibited by U.S. law and
the President abides by its finding and notice procedures.
VIII. "LAST-IN-TIME" U.S. LAWS AFFECTING TARGETED KILLING
We concluded in the prior section that the 1991 Act added no
new substantive limitations on targeted killings; instead, it
begged the question of their lawfulness by directing us to other
U.S. laws.43 We have argued that none prohibited such killings in
the early decades of the CIA's history-and the heyday of its in-
volvement in assassination planning and attempts-because, un-
der the "last-in-time" rule of statutory construction, the Fifth
Function of the National Security Act of 1947 superseded any
prohibition that the hoary Neutrality Act might place on such
killings and because no other arguably relevant contemporaneous
criminal law had extraterritorial application.439 It remains to be
seen, however, whether more recent legislation alters that con-
clusion. A 1972 law criminalizing the killing or attempted killing
of "a foreign official, official guest, or internationally protected
person" at first inspection seems to supersede the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947 and thus serve as a statute constraining targeted
killings.44' However, we show in this section that the prohibition
is irrelevant to the most probable locus of targeted killings-the
435. Id. § 413b(c)(1)-(2).
436. Id. § 413b(a)(5).
437. See id.
438. See supra Part VII.
439. See supra Part IV.
440. See 18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000).
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victims' home country. More significantly, even its narrow prohi-
bition may itself be superseded for the killing of terrorists pursu-
ant to the Antiterorrism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996,441 the targeted killing of Saddam Hussein and other mili-
tary leaders of Iraq during the Gulf War pursuant to the 1991
Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolu-
tion,442 or the targeted killing of persons involved in the Septem-
ber 11 terrorist attacks or who have provided aid or sanctuary to
such persons, pursuant to the 2001 Authorization for the Use of
Military Force.443
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1116
In 1976, the United States ratified the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro-
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,444 which called upon
signatory states to criminalize the killing of certain internation-
ally protected persons.44 The United States executed the treaty
by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1116, prohibiting the killing or attempted
killing of "a foreign official, official guest, or internationally pro-
tected person."4 6 The law's potential reach in prohibiting targeted
killing, however, was substantially shortened by its definition of
"foreign official" as a foreign official of "[c]abinet rank or
above.., while in the United States," and of an "internationally
protected person" as "a Chief of State or the political equivalent,
head of government, or Foreign Minister ... in a country other
than his own" or "who at the time and place concerned is entitled
pursuant to international law to special protection"447-an appar-
ent reference to the international law of diplomatic immunity for
persons posted abroad as official representatives of foreign gov-
ernments or international organizations.
Section 1116 therefore prohibits targeted killing of the identi-
fied persons outside their own country, but apparently not at
441. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
442. Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
443. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
444. Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
445. Id. at 1978, 1035 U.N.T.S. at 169.
446. 18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000).
447. Id. § 1116(b)(3)-(4) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 37:667
THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
home.44 Moreover, its prohibition does not apply at all to a pri-
vate non-state actor, like Osama bin Laden, who is not a foreign
official or an internationally protected person." 9
B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
In any case, even § 1116's prohibition-whether viewed as
statutory or treaty-based-can be superseded by subsequent in-
consistent statutes. Although repeal by implication is disfavored,
"where provisions in the two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the
later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier one."45 ° Well after enacting § 1116, Congress found
in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
("AEDPA")451 that
the President should use all necessary means, including covert ac-
tion and military force, to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy interna-
tional infrastructure used by international terrorists, including over-
seas terrorist training facilities and safe havens.
452
Does this provision of the AEDPA impliedly repeal § 1116 and
authorize targeted killing of foreign officials who might be found
at terrorist training facilities or safe havens outside their home
countries? 45
3
The first problem in arguing that it does is that the Act does
not expressly authorize targeted killing at all; it targets "interna-
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
451. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8, 18, 22, 28, 40 and 42 U.S.C.).
452. Id. § 324, 110 Stat. at 1255.
453. The AEDPA finding was cited by President Clinton's National Security Adviser
Sandy Berger as authority for the August 1998 cruise missile attacks on an alleged terror-
ist training camp in Afghanistan and on a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan alleged to have
been involved in manufacturing nerve agents for possible terrorist use. See DYCUS ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 364-66 & n.8. Training camps and manufacturing facilities are clearly
"infrastructure," but the attack on the camp was also apparently deliberately timed to kill
terrorist leaders thought to be meeting there and would thus constitute an attempted tar-
geted killing. Id. Section 1116 would not apply to such an attack because the terrorist
leaders who were expected to be at the camp presumably did not include "foreign officials"
or "internationally protected persons," other possibly than leaders of the Taliban, who
were in their own country and therefore outside the act for that reason. See Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 324(4), 110 Stat. at 1255.
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tional infrastructure used by international terrorists," not the
terrorists themselves, let alone persons who harbor them.454 If
Congress had wanted to authorize killings, it could surely have
expressed itself more directly (e.g., "all necessary means, includ-
ing lethal [or military] force").455 One may therefore reasonably
doubt whether a purpose to supersede the criminal law against
killing foreign officials and internationally protected persons was
"clearly" or "manifestly" expressed by the AEDPA.456 On the other
hand, Congress was surely mindful that the terrorists using such
facilities and safe havens could be present when they are de-
stroyed, as could their hosts. At the same time, the provision
leaves no doubt that the President should use "all necessary
means, including covert action and military force," which surely
embraces lethal force needed to kill the terrorists." 7
The second problem at first glance seems more daunting. The
provision was a "finding," appearing in the preamble to a far
more innocuous provision entitled "Prohibition on assistance to
countries that aid terrorist states.""45 The operative part of the
provision amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and sim-
ply required the President to withhold foreign assistance from
countries that aid any state which the Secretary of State deter-
mines to have repeatedly provided support for acts of interna-
tional terrorism.45 9 Only the operative part was actually codified
in the United States Code; the "all necessary means" finding ap-
peared in original Act.46° Arguably, this congressional "finding,"
like a "sense of the Congress" statement or a "whereas" clause is
merely precatory-Congress blowing rhetorical smoke461-and not
454. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 324(4), 110 Stat. at 1255.
455. See id.
456. See Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("[Tlhe intention of the
legislature to repeal [a prior inconsistent statute] must be clear and manifest."); Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933) (asserting that a treaty "will not be deemed to
have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless such purpose on the part of
Congress has been clearly expressed.").




461. The finding was briefly referenced in the conference report as urging the Presi-
dent to establish a White House counterterrorism office to coordinate counterterrorism
efforts and develop multinational responses to the threats of international terrorism. H.
REP. No. 104-518, at 114 (1996) (commenting on section 324 of the Act). There is appar-
ently no record of it ever having been the subject of any public debate in committee or on
the floor relating it to targeted killing or assassination.
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operative law.462 "Finding" that the President "shall" use all nec-
essary means to destroy terrorist infrastructure is like phrasing
"Thou shall not kill" as "[i]t is the sense of the Lord that thou
shall not kill. 463
The AEDPA provision can be construed as authority for tar-
geted killing of terrorists in another sense, however. Even if it did
not directly authorize such killing, it could be said to represent
congressional acquiescence to such acts by the executive on the
authority of customary law.464 The issue would then be whether
the AEDPA is "quiescence [which], at least as a practical matter,
enable[s], if not invite[s], measures on independent presidential
responsibility," and whether there is a sufficient practice known
to Congress to establish such customary law.46 5 When AEDPA
was enacted in 1996, Congress was aware of the 1986 air raid
against Libya, apparently partly targeting Quaddafi's personal
compound in retaliation for Libya's alleged orchestration of a ter-
rorist bombing in Berlin which killed U.S. servicemen.466 Two
years after AEDPA was enacted, the Administration ordered
cruise missile attacks on alleged terrorist training camps in Af-
ghanistan and alleged nerve gas manufacturing facilities in Su-
dan, citing the AEDPA provision as authority.467 If the practice of
targeting terrorists was insufficient to establish customary au-
thority in 1996, it was surely evolving by 1998, and may now re-
ceive congressional acceptance.
462. See, e.g., State Highway Comm'n ofMo. v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1120-21 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1973) (Stephenson, J., dissenting) ("It is now well established that statements of pol-
icy do not add to or alter specific operative provisions of a statute."). The majority in Volpe
followed a sense of the Congress provision stating Congress's view of "existing law," but it
is unclear whether they were giving effect to the sense-of-the-Congress statement or
merely agreeing with Congress's assessment therein of "existing" operative law. See also
Bennett C. Rushkoff, Note, A Defense of the War Powers Resolution, 93 YALE L.J. 1330,
1335-36 n.31 (1984) (arguing that the "policy" provision of War Powers Resolution is with-
out force and effect as law). Of course, sense-of-the-Congress statements, policy state-
ments, or findings in a statute may help guide interpretation of an operative provision
even if they themselves lack operative force.
463. See United States v. Shelhammer, 681 F. Supp. 819, 820 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (drawing
this analogy in finding that a sense-of-the-Congress provision is at most a guide to the
construction of the statute).
464. See supra Part II.D.
465. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
466. See DYCUS ET AL., supra note 10, at 351-52.
467. Id. at 365.
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C. The Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution
No such ambiguity surrounds Congress's grant of authority to
President George H.W. Bush in 1991 to use military force against
Iraq. The authorization expressly authorized the President to use
United States armed forces pursuant to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 678 "in order to achieve implementation" of
that resolution's precursors directed at Iraq.46 Although reason-
able people could disagree about whether the targeted killing of
Saddam Hussein-Iraq's senior military commander and its Chief
of State-is best calculated to implement resolutions calling for
Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and related resolutions, the
Commander in Chief Clause vests the full power of command of
U.S. forces in the President during an authorized war.4 69 As Pro-
fessor Berdahl has written, the President "alone ... determines
how the forces shall be used, for what purposes, the manner and
extent of their participation in campaigns, and the time of their
withdrawal," after Congress has authorized their use.17 ' Accord-
ingly, "he may do practically anything calculated to weaken and
destroy the fighting power of the enemy and bring the war to a
successful conclusion," subject to laws of war and the terms of the
congressional authorization.471
The abortive assassination ban proposed by the Church Com-
mittee in 1975 supports this conclusion, for, as noted above, it ex-
pressly applies only to officials of a foreign government on whom
we have not declared war or "against which United States Armed
Forces have not been introduced into hostilities or situations pur-
suant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution. 4 72 The
1991 Authorization provided that it "is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of... the
War Powers Resolution. 173 Thus, even the Church Committee
would not have applied its proposed ban on assassination to the
killing of Hussein during the Gulf War.
468. Authorization for Use of Military Forces Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-
01, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
469. See U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
470. CLARENCE A. BERDAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES
122 (1921) (citations omitted).
471. Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
472. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 283-84.
473. Pub. L. No. 102-01, § 2(c)(1), 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
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The issue posed by the Act is therefore not whether it permit-
ted the President to use U.S. armed forces to kill Saddam Hus-
sein during the Gulf War, but whether that permission survived
the ceasefire with Iraq in March 1991."' 4 Iraq subsequently vio-
lated the ceasefire in multiple respects,475 but does the violation of
a ceasefire reinstate full authority for the original conflict? There
are at least two reasons to doubt it.
First, the terms of the ceasefire were originally laid down in
1991 under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687.476
Iraq's undertaking therefore ran to the United Nations, not to the
United States. When it subsequently violated the terms, the Se-
curity Council-not any individual member state-determined
the nature of the response in a succession of resolutions.477 Some
were merely condemnatory and hortatory, and some referred to
continuing the "duration of prohibitions" on Iraq laid down in
Resolution 687; but significantly, none repeated the Security
Council's original 1990 formula for military sanctions: "au-
thoriz[ing] member states... to use all necessary means to up-
hold and implement the Security Council Resolution 660 [de-
manding Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent
relevant resolutions."478 If the Security Council, which had fixed
the terms of the ceasefire, did not call for the use of force by
member states to enforce the ceasefire in any "subsequent rele-
vant resolution," arguably no member state could draw authority
from any of the resolutions to do so unilaterally.479
Nor does the 1991 authorization for the Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution go any further, tied as it expressly was to
Security Council Resolution 678 and its precursors.8 0 Moreover,
stepping back from its express language, its practical intent was
to authorize the use of U.S. military to oust Iraq from Kuwait and
to accomplish related objectives set out in Security Council reso-
474. See Alfred B. Prados, Iraq: Former and Recent Military Confrontations with the
United States (Cong. Res. Serv. Issue Brief No. 94049, Sept. 6, 2002).
475. See generally id.
476. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991).
477. See Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, A Decade of Decep-
tion and Defiance: Saddam Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations (Sept. 12, 2002) (list-
ing the violated United Nations Resolutions), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912.html.
478. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46 (1990).
479. Id.
480. See Pub. L. No. 102-1, § 2(a), 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
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lutions prior to 678.4"1 None of these resolutions, or any subse-
quent relevant resolution, sought regime change. Even if petti-
fogging lawyers contrived a cut-and-paste case from the 1991 au-
thorization for authority to kill Saddam Hussein more than a
decade later, it would offend any conceivable spirit of the original
legislation, taking it far beyond its understood purpose.
D. The 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
No such heroic-and, we have argued, insupportable-
construction is necessary to find that the 2001 Authorization for
Use of Military Force authorized targeted killing.4" 2 Enacted just
days after the September 11 attacks, the joint resolution author-
ized the President
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, or-
ganizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, commit-
ted, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent
any future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.
Not only does the resolution thus expressly authorize "all nec-
essary and appropriate force" (not limited, despite its official title,
to "military" force), but it also provides that "it is intended to con-
stitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of sec-
tion 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." '484 In terms of the original
Church Committee bill on assassination, to which we have looked
in interpreting the ban of Executive Order No. 12,333, the 2001
Authorization thus left nothing to chance; it would take any con-
sequent targeted killing outside even the Church bill, and, we
have argued, outside the order.
Moreover, the target list is equally unambiguous, burying any
distinction among foreign officials, internationally protected per-
sons, freelance terrorists, or other private persons. 45 All are per-
missible targets provided that they planned, authorized, commit-
481. See id.
482. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
483. Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
484. Id. § 2(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 224.
485. Id. § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
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ted, or aided the September 11 attacks or harbored those who
did.486 Here then, is the answer under U.S. law to the proposal to
go after not just the heads, but "the arms and fingers" of the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist networks:487 Congress said, go do it.
Yet the sweep of the 2001 authorization for targeted killing
should not blind us to its predicate: involvement in the September
11 attacks or harboring those who were involved. Osama bin
Laden is fair game, if not on the strangely piecemeal and casual
proof put out by the U.S. government, or the more formal white
paper released by the British government,4 8 then by his own ad-
mission.489 But, at this writing, Saddam Hussein is not. No credi-
ble publicly released evidence links him to the September 11 at-
tacks, as, indeed, the administration admitted in early September
2002.490 Furthermore, even other terrorist networks which target
U.S. persons or property do not fall with the 2001 authorization
unless they also meet the September 11 predicate. There is there-
fore still a narrow role for 18 U.S.C. § 1116 to play in restricting
targeted killing.
IX. EXERCISING ASSASSINATION AUTHORITY INDIRECTLY:
AGENTS, SUPPORT FOR COUPS, AND THE USE OF "DIRTY ASSETS"
The Church Committee learned in its investigations that
United States involvement in assassination had been largely in-
direct.49' For the most part, the CIA supported coup plotters who
may have planned to kill the disfavored foreign leader or provided
technical means for a hired assassin to act on his own.492 To the
extent that the authority to engage in targeted killing exists, do
the same rules apply when the United States hires an agent to do
486. Id.
487. Lawrence J. Siskind, Our Killer Instinct, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at 61.
488. Press Release, 10 Downing Street, Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the
United States, Nov. 14, 2001, available at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/page3863.asp.
489. Elisabeth Bumiller, A Nation Challenged: The Video; Bin Laden, on Tape, Boasts
of Trade Center Attacks; U.S. Says It Proves His Guilt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at Al.
490. Dana Priest, U.S. Not Claiming Iraqi Link to Terror, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2002,
at Al. But see Eric Schmitt, Rumsfeld Says U.S. Has "Bulletproof' Evidence of Iraq's Links
to al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2002, at A9 (acknowledging information regarding links
between Baghdad and al-Qaida was reliable, but that it is "probably not strong enough to
hold up in an American court").
491. See supra Part V.B.
492. Id.
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the killing, or supports foreign dissidents engaged in a coup? If
so, how does the indirect nature of the resulting United States in-
volvement in the targeted killing affect its legality?
Even the earliest U.S. intelligence operations delegated the
task outside government. George Washington and other early
Presidents hired agents outside the United States to carry out in-
telligence gathering operations.493 In more recent times, the CIA
relied on proprietaries-business entities wholly owned by the
CIA-either to do business or appear to do business as an adjunct
to the conduct of intelligence operations.494 The Church Commit-
tee found that the CIA relied on the Fifth Function and the Cen-
tral Intelligence Act of 1949 to establish proprietaries in support
of covert operations, most notably in Laos, where upwards of
20,000 Hmong and other tribesmen became United States-paid
"volunteers" fighting the Pathet Lao.4 95
The Lumumba and Castro episodes investigated by the Church
Committee serve as stark examples of direct, albeit failed, at-
tempts by the United States to kill a foreign leader.4 96 The plan to
poison Lumumba was in-house, conceived of and planned for exe-
cution by CIA operatives.4 97 Of at least eight plots to kill Castro,
most were strictly operations conducted by the CIA (or its dele-
gates, including mob operatives) and were thus considered direct
attempts, including mob operatives or others. 498 At least one op-
eration, however, involved supplying weapons to a Cuban dissi-
dent inside the government who sought the means to kill Castro
as a prerequisite to a successful coup.4 99
In the Church Committee's investigations of CIA involvement
in coup-related assassination plots, it found that U.S. officials
consistently "had exaggerated notions about their ability to con-
trol the actions of coup leaders." °° In the CIA's dealings with dis-
sident groups in South Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic,
it found that its efforts to halt a coup (in Vietnam) or an assassi-
493. See WRISTON, supra note 113, at 19-37.
494. FINAL REPORT, supra note 315, at 205.
495. See id. at 206; PRADOS, supra note 128, at 261-96.
496. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 4-5.
497. Id. at 19-37.
498. Id. at 71-72.
499. Id. at 86-90.
500. Id. at 256.
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nation attempt (against Trujillo) "could not be turned off to suit
the convenience of the United States government."5°" Although
the targets died in the instances of Vietnam, the Dominican Re-
public, and Chile (where the United States supported the coup),
the United States did not directly participate in the assassination
attempts.0 2 In Vietnam, the assassination was apparently a
spontaneous act, carried out without U.S. knowledge or sup-
port.50 3 In the Dominican Republic, U.S. officials were at least
aware that the dissidents supported by the United States planned
to kill Trujillo." 4 However, "conflicting evidence [exists] concern-
ing whether weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the as-
sassination, and whether they were in fact so used."505 In Chile,
General Schneider apparently died when he was shot trying to
fend off his abduction by Chilean coup plotters.0 ' Although the
United States supported the coup to prevent Allende from taking
office, there is no evidence that the United States either planned
Schneider's death or anticipated that he would be killed.50 7 In
Cuba and the Congo, United States involvement was more direct
because the deaths of Castro and Lumumba were more clearly
sought by the United States.0 8 Accordingly, the Church Commit-
tee reserved its strongest condemnation for the latter two cases.50 9
Thus, it was hardly surprising that the Church Committee
found that assassination was not an acceptable policy.510 Yet
when the Church Committee issued its prescriptions for U.S. pol-
icy on targeted killings, the Committee pointedly did not prohibit
all killing during coup attempts.51 Instead, the Committee stated
that "[tihe possibility of assassination ... is one of the issues to be
considered in determining the propriety of United States in-
volvement... particularly... where the assassination of a for-
eign leader is a likely prospect."1 2
501. Id. at 257.






508. See id. at 257.
509. See id. at 257-58.
510. Id. at 258.
511. See supra Part V.F.
512. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 209, at 258.
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As we discussed above, President Ford successfully headed-off
a statutory charter for regulating intelligence operations in part
by promulgating Executive Order 11,905.13 But the order did not
address support to others, such as indigenous groups, who might
kill a leader in carrying out a coup.514 Another provision of the
Ford order refused to "authorize any activity not previously au-
thorized and [did] not provide exemption from any restrictions
otherwise applicable.5 15 This disclaimer merely left the law un-
disturbed, and the ambiguous state of the law regarding United
States support for others who assassinate in carrying out a coup
was also unaffected.
Executive Order 12,036 did expressly extend the prohibition to
any person "acting on behalf of' the U.S. government.516 President
Carter's update also stated that "[n]o agency of the Intelligence
Community shall request or otherwise encourage, directly or in-
directly, any person, organization, or government agency to un-
dertake activities forbidden by the order or applicable law. 51
7
Thus, agents acting on behalf of the United States are covered by
the proscription. 1 8 However, the "directly or indirectly" proviso
forbids U.S. officials from encouraging any person "employed by
or acting on behalf of' the United States to carry out an assassi-
nation. 9 Nothing in the Carter order further clarifies the legality
of United States support for a coup in which a third party may
engage in assassination. Narrowly construed, the executive order
might not stand in the way of U.S. support for a coup where the
death of a leader is likely, so long as U.S. officials do not approve
of plans to kill the leader.52 ° As usual, the devil lies in the details.
If the CIA is involved in assisting foreign military officers or dis-
sidents planning a coup, to what extent will officials know
whether the coup will be bloodless or violent, whether the coup
leaders or operatives plan to kill the existing leader, and whether
the coup leaders are fully communicating their plans to the CIA,
or are being honest in their appraisals?
513. See supra Part VIA.
514. See Exec. Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90 (1976).
515. Id. § 5.
516. Exec. Order No. 12,036, § 2-305, 3 C.F.R. 112 (1978).
517. Id. § 2-307.
518. See id.
519. Id. § 2-305.
520. Id.
[Vol. 37:667
THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The U.S. efforts to remove General Manuel Noriega from power
in Panama in the late 1980s illustrate the dimensions of the
agent/coup problem. In 1988, the Reagan Administration's plan to
support a coup to topple Noriega ended when the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee formally opposed the plan in a letter to Presi-
dent Reagan.521 A CIA assessment had indicated that Noriega
might be killed in the operation, and that the United States did
not control the operatives who would carry out the coup.
5 22
In 1989, President George H.W. Bush took tentative steps to
support a coup attempt by Panamanian dissidents.523 When the
Intelligence Committees reviewed the plans with CIA officials, it
was revealed that the coup planners in Panama told the CIA sta-
tion chief that they intended to kill Noriega.5 24 The CIA also re-
ported grave uncertainties about the prospects for success of the
coup.52 Caution prompted by the executive order ban on assassi-
nation caused the operational role of the United States to be
strictly limited to preventing pro-Noriega reinforcements from
reaching the Noreiga headquarters. 26 Although the dissidents
succeeded initially in taking Noriega captive in an October 1989
coup, their plan began to weaken after Noriega was permitted to
communicate with his loyalists, and the United States did noth-
ing to salvage the situation.527 Noriega's men successfully crushed
the dissident's attack and the reinforcements were not needed.52
Within days, DCI William H. Webster publicly argued for a re-
laxation of the interpretation of the assassination ban that pro-
hibited United States assistance to a coup that could lead to the
death of a nation's leader.5 29 While he offered assurances that the
United States would not engage in 'selective, individual assassi-
nation,"' Webster argued that "'when despots take over, there has
521. Stephen Engelberg & Susan F. Rasky, White House, Noriega and Battle in Con-




525. Stephen Engelberg, C.I.A. Seeks Looser Rules on Killings During Coups, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 1989, at Al.
526. REBECCA L. GRANT, OPERATION JUST CAUSE AND THE U.S. POLICY PROCESS 33
(1991).
527. Id. at 34.
528. Id.
529. Engelberg, supra note 525, at Al.
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to be a means to deal with that.' 51 0 The eventual military opera-
tion that ended Noriega's tenure in December 1989, Operation
Just Cause, included a frontal assault on Noriega's headquar-
ters.531 Noriega was eventually arrested and removed to the
United States.532
The exchanges between the Intelligence Committees and the
Reagan and Bush administrations over the executive order provi-
sion illustrate the ambiguity in the ban as it applies to U.S. sup-
port of foreign groups that engage in a coup resulting in the death
of a foreign leader. After the Panama invasion, critics complained
that Executive Order 12,333's prohibition on assassination stood
in the way of a cheaper and easier way of removing Noriega1
33
Others opined that the ban would not prohibit support of the kind
of coup attempt presented in October 1989.13' Among them, Sena-
tor Boren argued that U.S. support for a coup would not be pro-
hibited if assassination was not an explicit objective of the opera-
tion.5 35 The Justice Department also concluded that the executive
order ban would not necessarily preclude the United States from
assisting in a coup if there was no specific intent to kill the for-
eign leader, even if force was contemplated and the likelihood of
violence was high.53 In effect, each case would have to be re-
viewed to determine the applicability of the assassination ban.537
According to CIA lawyer Jonathan Fredman, if the President
directs the CIA to provide "arms and training" to foreign coup
plotters, the agency must provide instruction on U.S. law, includ-
ing the assassination ban.53 The instruction must stress that the
coup plotters should seek to avoid violence, must accept surren-
der if it is offered, and must only allow the use of force in the
event of armed opposition.539 By these criteria, the operational
role of the United States in the October 1989 coup was correctly
curtailed, given the statement by the coup plotters that they
530. Id.
531. See GRANT, supra note 526, at 37.
532. Id. at 38.
533. See Thomas Powers, The Perils of Covert Policy: Snares and Seductions, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 1989, at M1.
534. See id.
535. Id.
536. Fredman, supra note 11, at 19.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id. at 19-20.
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planned to kill Noriega. Nor would the positions of DCI Webster
or Senator Boren be consistent with the CIA interpretation of the
executive order.
How would the cases investigated by the Church Committee
fare under the more recent rules? The Lumumba operation and
most of the Castro plans would clearly have been proscribed as
direct or indirect participation in assassination. The Castro plot,
which involved assassination as a prerequisite to a coup, would
also likely fail the test because the United States approved the
plans and supplied the means to affect the killing. The Trujillo
case is less clear, in part because of conflicting evidence, but it is
at least arguable that United States officials would have violated
the ban by generally supporting the dissidents and supplying
guns that could have been used to carry out the attack. The
Schneider death would not likely be ascribed to the United States
under the circumstances because the operatives shot Schneider
when he resisted the kidnapping attempt. The United States had
also disavowed its support of the particular group that carried out
the abduction. Finally, the Diem killing was spur-of-the-moment,
and the United States would not be legally responsible for his
death. The plans for the coup, supported by United States offi-
cials, did not include assassination.
In the decades since the Church Committee and the executive
order trilogy, much of foreign intelligence has been devoted to
counterterrorism.54 Among the techniques for collecting counter-
terrorism intelligence, the CIA has recruited from within terrorist
organizations. 41 Such a source may become a "dirty asset" if he
has, before or during his relationship with the CIA, violated U.S.
laws, including the ban on assassination.5 42 For example, in the
1970s the CIA recruited the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) Chief of Intelligence, Ali Hassan Salameh 43 Through
Salameh, the CIA learned about terrorist activities and groups,
and Salameh intervened to stop planned attacks. 44 Salameh was
also a member of the "Black September" organization, and he
may have helped plan the slaughter of Israeli athletes at the Mu-
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nich Olympics in 1972."' 8 Ironically, the CIA reportedly targeted
Salameh for assassination, although agents continued to work
with him until the Israelis killed him in 1979.54
In response to widespread media attention devoted to the tor-
ture, disappearance, or death of U.S. citizens in Guatemala in the
1980s and early 1990s, President Clinton directed the Intelli-
gence Oversight Board ("IOB") to review allegations that the CIA
was responsible for some of the reported atrocities involving
Americans. 47 The IOB found that, to achieve laudable goals in
Guatemala, the CIA must "deal with some unsavory groups and
individuals" including instances where "allegations of serious
human rights abuse [were] made against several station assets or
liaison contacts. 548 In response to headlines generated by accusa-
tions that the CIA conspired with Guatemalan military officers in
torture, murder, and other atrocities in Guatemala, the CIA is-
sued guidelines in 1995 to make case officers more selective in
their recruiting. 549 Apparently the guidelines require case officers
to obtain a waiver from CIA headquarters before employing any
asset whose background includes assassinations, torture, or other
serious criminal activities.55 ° The June 2000 Report of the Na-
tional Commission on Terrorism maintained that the guidelines
"have deterred and delayed vigorous efforts to recruit potentially
useful informants. The CIA has created a climate that is overly
risk averse."5 1 Although a CIA spokesperson later defended the
guidelines and said that they had not impeded the agency in its
counterterrorism efforts,552 Congress acted in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist attacks to direct the DCI to rescind the
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE GUATEMALA REVIEW (June 28,
1996), available at http://www.us.net/cip/iob.htm.
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id. ("Guidance has been recently issued for dealing with serious human rights vio-
lations or crimes of violence by assets .... We believe this guidance srikes an appropriate
balance by generally barring such relationships but permitting appropriately senior offi-
cials to authorize them in special cases when national security interests warrant.").
551. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORISM, COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (June 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/com
mission.html.
552. See Congress Rushes In, SECRECY NEWS (Fed'n of Am. Scientists/Project on Gov't
Secrecy, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 14, 2001, at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2001/09/
091401.html.
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portions of the 1995 guidelines that pertain to the recruitment of
counterterrorism assets. 53 The same law requires the DCI to "is-
sue new guidelines that more appropriately weigh and incentivize
risks" in obtaining information from human sources about poten-
tial plans or attacks. 54
If the 1995 guidelines discourage dirty asset hiring, the new
rules may give more hiring discretion to the field officers. If the
CIA can recruit known terrorists for counterterrorism purposes,
such discretion almost surely extends to recruiting trained assas-
sins. However, the legal restrictions on targeted killing still ap-
ply, and the assets would be agents acting on behalf of the United
States in carrying out their activities. The post-September 11 leg-
islation may or may not loosen control over who is recruited, but
it does not affect the rules on targeted killing.
X. CONCLUSION
The legal debate about assassination has focused too long and
too superficially on Executive Order No. 12,333, and not enough
on domestic legal authorities beyond the order. Proposed statu-
tory responses to this debate have, therefore, understandably
been misdirected as well. Such responses, however, provide a use-
ful vehicle for concluding our analysis of the full range of legal
authorities.
Reading the order as a full stop to targeted killing, Congress-
man Bob Barr of Georgia introduced a bill in 2001 to Congress
antiseptically short-titled as the Terrorist Elimination Act of
2001 for the purposes of "nullify[ing] the effect of certain provi-
sions of various Executive orders."555 Finding that "past Presi-
dents have issued Executive orders which severely limit the use
of the military when dealing with potential threats against the
United States of America," the bill provides that the assassina-
tion provisions of Executive Orders 11,905, 12,036 and 12,333
"shall have no further force or effect."556
553. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 403,
115 Stat. 1394, 1403 (2001).
554. Id. § 403(2), 115 Stat. at 1403.
555. Terrorist Elimination Act of 2001, H.R. 19, 107th Cong. (2001).
556. Id. §§ 2-3.
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The proposed finding is wrong, and the "nullification of effect"
of the orders unnecessary, unwise, and possibly itself without le-
gal effect.557
In the first place, even the Church Committee assassination
ban which the first executive order preempted had no application
to targeted killing by the military in declared war, hostilities au-
thorized consistently by the War Powers Resolution, or a national
emergency created by an attack on the United States. If the order
can reasonably be construed in light of the bill which it was in-
tended to preempt, the order should not apply in these situations
either.
Moreover, the first executive order adopted the bill's language
of "political assassination," and we have tried to show that the
omission of "political" in later orders did not substantively change
the definition. Consequently, if a targeted killing by the military
or any other agency of the United States is in anticipatory self-
defense, and not merely to punish the victim for his political
views or positions, it is not "[political] assassination" within the
ambit of the orders.
If we are right, and the orders do not "severely limit" the tar-
geted killing option as a matter of law, then Barr's attempt to
nullify the effect of the orders is unnecessary. The orders do not
prevent the defensive use of targeted killing by the military or the
CIA, and, if they did, they could be waived, as we have shown.
Furthermore, the bill ignores the green light which the 1991 Au-
thorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
gave for targeted killing during the Gulf War, as well as Con-
gress's acquiescence in-if not delegation of authority for-
targeting killing of terrorists in attacks on terrorist infrastruc-
ture, as reflected in the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. And, of course, the January 2001 bill did not antici-
pate Congress's September 2001 authorization of "all necessary
and appropriate force" against the September 11 perpetrators and
their helpers or protectors.
If the executive orders therefore do not "severely limit" the use
of the military as a legal matter, they may nevertheless discour-
age the use of targeted killing as a practical matter, because they
effectively forbid such an operation without prior specific ap-
557. See id.
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proval by the President. But this result merely reflects the utility
of the orders as management controls, and, indeed, is consistent
with the procedural limitations which Congress itself has placed
on covert action and "significant anticipated intelligence activi-
ties" by intelligence oversight legislation. The requirement for
presidential approval may make resort to targeted killing less
common than it was in the heyday of CIA assassination involve-
ment, but even the Barr bill itself concedes that such killing "is a
remedy which should be used sparingly and considered only after
all other reasonable options have failed or are not avail-
able .... "558
Finally, to the extent that the Barr bill purports to remove the
President's management control, it is unclear whether it is consti-
tutional. Authorizing the President to use targeted killing is one
thing; dictating how he does so is another. If, as we have argued,
the orders really function as management controls reserving the
decision for targeted killing to the President alone, it is unclear
whether Congress may simply nullify the control or whether it is
an executive prerogative. We are inclined to find wide constitu-
tional leeway for Congress to add controls and improve on the
process by insisting upon written presidential findings and notice
to the intelligence committees, but even this effort at disciplining
the executive decisionmaking process has been attacked by some
scholars as an invasion of executive prerogative. We would at
least agree that statutory interventions in an executive decision-
making process require the most sensitive application. Sensitive
is not an adjective that fits the heavy-handed H.R. 19 "to nullify
the effect of certain provisions" of three executive orders that the
last seven Presidents have apparently followed consistently.559
What then of legislation to prohibit "assassination of foreign of-
ficials under any circumstances," as some scholars have advo-
cated?5 ° Such legislation would certainly fill a gap in the U.S.
law. Other scholars have concluded that "the current Order ap-
pears to be the sole source of the prohibition" on assassination,
558. Id. § 2(6).
559. Id.
560. Johnson, supra note 11, at 434; see also Brandenburg, supra note 71, at 696-97
(asserting that "a legislative ban on assassinations deserves enactment"). Brandenburg
earlier defined "assassination" to include the killing of "internationally protected per-
son[s]," as defined by treaty and 18 U.S.C. § 1116, but extending it to persons "even while
inside their own territory." Id. at 655 n.1.
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though we have shown that § 1116 of the criminal code adds a
narrow further limitation for internationally protected persons
outside their home country. 561
A more sweeping ban on "assassination in any circumstances,"
however, might well sweep the use of targeted killing in author-
ized hostilities or in anticipatory self-defense under its ambit as
well, depending on how it defined "assassination." Not only do we
seriously doubt the wisdom of leaving this weapon on the table,
especially where it holds out hope of using less aggregate violence
than would the alternative of overt full-spectrum military force,
but it could also be unconstitutional to deny it to the President if
he is responding to continuing attack. The constitutionality of an-
ticipatory self-defense is still an unresolved question, just start-
ing to receive the attention it deserves in an era of increasingly
violent terrorist attacks on the United States, but it is sufficiently
difficult to counsel hesitation in enacting any absolute statutory
ban.
At the other extreme, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
recently proposed to expand the role of special operations military
forces to seek out and target with lethal force those associated
with al-Qaida, even in countries where the United States is not at
war, and without notifying local governments in advance.562 Re-
gardless of the reach of the 2001 resolution authorizing military
force, substituting military personnel for CIA operatives in tar-
geted killing operations would undermine the regime created by
the executive order and the intelligence oversight laws for
managing such sensitive operations.563 Instead of presidential
findings and reporting to the Intelligence Committees, military
commanders could, under Secretary Rumsfeld's proposal, order
targeted killings anywhere in the world, subject only to the mili-
tary chain of command.6 4 The system now in place is far better.65
561. Fredman, supra note 11, at 24 n.6. Fredman was writing in 1997. He noted that
neither the Department of Justice nor the Congress could find any other domestic legal
limitation as of 1976. Fredman, supra note 11, at 24 n.6. This conclusion was also reached
by the court in Lopez-Lima, as we discuss above. United States v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F.
Supp. 1404, 1410 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
562. Lawrence J. Korb & Jonathon D. Tepperman, Soldiers Should Not Be Spies, N.Y.
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This is not to conclude that the present legal framework is
ideal. The order's continued use of the term "assassination," with-
out definition or limitation, leaves an ambiguity which prompts
misunderstanding of its effect and responses like Representative
Barr's. It would be preferable to supply a definition, drawing on
the original Church Committee bill and the since-evolved theory
of anticipatory self-defense. Similarly, the managerial effect of
the order is implicit rather than explicit, and the order makes no
reference at all to the related procedural requirements of the in-
telligence oversight regime. These deficiencies in the current re-
gime point to a refinement of the executive order, perhaps, more
than they do to a superseding statute (if one could supersede the
order).
However, a statutory deficiency also exists in the current legal
framework. We have shown that "covert action" and "significant
anticipated intelligence activity" should be construed to embrace
targeted killing. But past experience, notably in the Iran-Contra
affair, suggests any ambiguity in the intelligence oversight re-
gime may be exploited by some administration in the future.
Therefore, a case may be made for revising intelligence oversight
legislation to make explicit the inclusion of targeted killing
within the scope of the legislation's presidential finding and no-
tice requirements.
These, however, at most refine rather than radically change
the current United States legal framework for targeted killing.
They also divide the labor fairly, and, we believe, constitutionally
between the branches. And they leave the nasty business of tar-
geted killing where it should lie, as a permissible but tightly
managed and fully accountable weapon of national self-defense in
an era of horrific terrorist attacks on the United States and its
people.
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